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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND  
Historically, unmarried fathers had no rights in respect of their children born out of 
wedlock. “Until 1998, the unmarried father had obligations to his child under common 
law, but did not have any inherent rights with regard to the child.”1 This position 
changed when they were awarded limited rights in terms of the Natural Fathers of 
Children Born out of Wedlock Act 86 of 1997.This position has further been developed 
by the Children’s Act 38 of 2005. Section 21 of the Children’s Act (hereafter the Act) 
now provides for the acquisition parental rights and responsibilities in respect of 
unmarried fathers if certain requirements are met. 
This section, although it seems enforceable on paper, brought along its own set of rules 
and challenges. Challenges include, amongst others, inequality between unmarried 
biological fathers and biological mothers of the children born out of wedlock. The 
children are affected insofar as their right to a family, or to have contact with both 
parents, can be substantially infringed. 
The Children’s Act makes provision for both full or specific parental responsibilities and 
rights in respect of a child. The Act clearly defines parental responsibilities and rights in 
Section 18 (2)2 thereof. 
 
                                                          
1 Boezaart T “Child Law in South Africa” (2009) 71 
2 Section 18 (2) of Act 38 of 2005 reads as follows: 
  ‘18 (2) the parental responsibilities and rights that a person may have in respect of a child include the   
   responsibility and the right- 
   (a) to care for the child; 
   (b) to maintain contact with the child; 
   (c) to act as guardian of the child; and  
   (d) to contribute to the maintenance of the child.’ 
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2. ACQUISITION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The Act draws a clear distinction between the acquisition of parental responsibilities and 
rights of married and unmarried fathers. In respect of married fathers, the acquisition of 
parental responsibilities and rights are automatic if they fulfil one of the requirements 
mentioned in section 20.3 
This section places the father on an equal footing with the biological mother. Hence in 
the event of divorce or separation of the biological parents after the birth of the child, or 
during the pregnancy, the father retains his full parental responsibilities and rights, 
provided for by section 20 of the Act. 
In the event where the father does not fall within the categories mentioned in section 20 
of the Act, provision is made for him in section 21 of the Act.  
Interpretation of section 21 remains a challenge, not only to unmarried fathers, but also 
to our courts. Our courts have attempted to interpret these provisions and many 
different approaches have been used. In 2013 the KZN High Court4  considered all the 
factors of section 21 in determining whether or not the biological father of the child had 
indeed acquired parental responsibilities and rights. One of the big challenges with the 
section, is the word “and” between 21 (b) (ii) and (iii). The question that arises is 
                                                          
3 Section 20 of Act 38 of 2005 reads as follows: 
  ‘The biological father of a child has full parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the child- 
(a) if he is married to the child’s mother 
(b) if he was married to the child’s mother at- 
 (i)the time of the child’s conception; 
 (ii) the time of the child’s birth; or 
 (iii) any time between the child’s conception and birth’ 
4 I v C and Another [2014] ZAKZDHC 11 
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whether the requirements of either subsections (ii) or (iii) should be satisfied or whether 
the requirements of both subsections must be satisfied to acquire parental rights and 
responsibilities. In 2014, the North West High Court only looked at section 21 (b) (ii) to 
determine whether the biological father had indeed acquired parental responsibilities 
and rights.5 Beyl6 agrees with Boezaart7  that the requirements of section 21 (b) (ii) and 
(iii) are cumulative and that an unmarried father must fulfil all three requirements of the 
section to automatically acquire parental rights and responsibilities.8 Davel and Skelton 
in their Commentary are of the opinion that the word “and” connects the two 
subsections and therefore all the requirements of the section must be satisfied to enable 
an unmarried father to qualify for automatic parental rights and responsibilities.9 
3. DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
The Act makes provision for mediation in the event of disputes arising between the 
biological parents of a child.10 The Act prescribes that the matter should be referred to 
the Office of the Family Advocate, a social worker or any other suitably qualified social 
service professional for mediation to be attempted. This provision can be found in the 
latter part of section 21 of the Act. 
                                                          
5 R v S [2014] ZANWHC 3 
6 Beyl A, Critical  Analysis of Section 21 of the Children’s  Act 38 of 2005 with specific reference to the     
  Parental Responsibilities and Rights of unmarried fathers (LLM Dissertation 2013 University Pretoria)  
7 Boezaart T Child Law in South Africa (2009) p74 
8 Beyl A, (2013)138 
9 Davel CJ,Skelton A “Commentary on the Children’s Act” 3-11 
10 S21(3) of Act 38 of 2005 
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4. PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AGREEMENTS 
The Act added another segment to the rights of unmarried fathers. Unmarried fathers 
can now, in terms of section 22 of the Act, enter into a parental rights and 
responsibilities agreement with the biological mother of the minor child. Such agreement 
must be drafted in a prescribed form. It is also a requirement that before registration of 
the agreement, the Offices of the Family Advocate or the relevant court must be 
satisfied that such agreement is in the best interests of the child.11 Further, the Act 
prescribes that such agreement only takes effect if it is registered with the Offices of the 
Family Advocate or if it had been made an order of court by the High Court, Divorce 
Court (Regional Court) or the children’s court.12 It is clear that the law has indeed been 
developed to give parental responsibilities and rights to some unmarried fathers.13  
Implementation of section 21 of the Children’s Act is however still a challenge. As a 
result of the criterion set out in section 21 of the Children’s Act, not all unmarried fathers 
can automatically acquire parental rights and responsibilities. Beyl14 focusses on the 
commitment of the unmarried father and believes that the unmarried father’s 
commitment towards the child should be considered as opposed to his commitment 
towards the child’s mother.  Hence the question as to whether the position of unmarried 
fathers has changed or not still remains in limbo.15  
                                                          
11 S22(5) of Act 38 of 2005 
12 S22(4)(a) and(b) of Act 38 of 2005 
13 Beyl in her thesis critically analyses section 21 with specific reference to parental rights and   
    responsibilities of unmarried fathers.  
14 Beyl A, (2013)21 
15 Beyl in her thesis specifically discusses the transformation of rights of unmarried fathers as well as the  
   fact that their position in respect of their biological children remains practically unchanged. 
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The thesis will discuss the challenges faced by unmarried fathers, starting with 
enforcing the provisions of the Act up to the point of enforcement of a court order, where 
one has been obtained. 
5. RIGHT TO EQUALITY 
Another aspect that this thesis will consider is the right to equality as is enshrined in the 
Constitution.16 The Constitution in section 9 thereof, provides for equal and fair 
treatment of all citizens of the republic. However, section 21 of the Act does not seem to 
comply with the provision of the Constitution.17 The Act draws a clear distinction 
between married and unmarried fathers in respect of the acquisition of parental 
responsibilities and rights. In the case of unmarried fathers, the Act provides that certain 
requirements must be met before an unmarried father can acquire parental rights and 
responsibilities and in the case of married fathers, the acquisition is automatic. This is 
on the face of it discriminatory; an unmarried father should not be treated differently 
because of his marital status. These requirements of the Act do not amount to equal 
treatment. However, the question is whether the limitation of the rights of unmarried 
fathers is justifiable? The research will aim to reflect how the rights of unmarried fathers 
in respect of access to their children are limited. An unmarried father, even while having 
the status of a biological father, must undergo many challenges to acquire parental 
rights and responsibilities. Whereas in the  case of married fathers, irrespective of the 
relationship between the parents of the child or the best interests of the child, the 
                                                          
16 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
17 Skelton is of the opinion that the section clearly indicates that unmarried fathers are not on equal   
    footing as unmarried mothers who acquire full parental rights and responsibilities simply because she        
    gave birth to the child irrespective of her marital status. Skelton A “Family Law in South Africa”(2010)                                     
    246 
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biological father acquires parental responsibilities, by virtue of being married to the 
biological mother.   
The inequality could have an effect on the children involved in these disputes. All 
children have a right to parental care and the best interests of a child are of paramount 
importance when it comes to any decisions being made where a child is a subject. This 
is provided for in the Constitution, the Children’s Act as well as international instruments 
to which South Africa is a state party. The aforesaid legislation and instruments do not 
draw a distinction between children born in or outside of wedlock. Therefore the 
question as to why section 21 of the Children’s Act omitted the best interests of the child 
remains unanswered. 
6. RESEARCH QUESTION(S): 
1. How enforceable are the rights of unmarried fathers, as they are entrenched in 
section 21 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005? Should more unmarried fathers be 
awarded automatic rights? Are the criteria for determining which fathers acquire 
rights fair and just? 
2. Can the challenges as discovered in question one be remedied by the legislator?  
7. OBJECTIVES: 
The objectives of this study are firstly to examine academic literature on the 
enforcement of parental rights and responsibilities of unmarried fathers. In addition to 
the aforesaid, the legislation in its current form will be examined and a critical analysis 
of the implementation thereof will be done. Lastly, the writer will make proposals and 
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recommendations to amend the current legislation so as to accommodate the needs of 
unmarried fathers in general. 
8. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
The study will contribute to the current literature on parental rights and responsibilities of 
unmarried fathers. Emphasis will be placed especially on those individuals who are not 
in a position to litigate further than the lower courts due to income restraints. Further, 
the study will look at the contribution of all the role-players in the application process 
towards the realisation of the rights of unmarried fathers. Proposals to change or amend 
the legislation will be made so as to accommodate all unmarried fathers with a view to 
enforcing their parental rights and responsibilities. This will be done by considering the 
South African Law Reform Commission’s Issue Paper no 31,18 released two weeks 
before the submission of this dissertation. 
9. RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH 
In terms of our common law, unmarried fathers had absolutely no rights in respect of 
their children. The position has since changed as is clear from the background of the 
study. The law has developed so as to accommodate some unmarried fathers, but to 
date many unmarried fathers find themselves in the same position as they were in 
before 2007. Implementation of the law in relation to unmarried fathers and enforcing 
their rights are still challenging. The rationale of this research is to attempt to make 
recommendations to the legislature in respect of amending the Children’s Act in an 
attempt to make enforcement of these rights more effective. As a legal practitioner, the 
                                                          
18SALRC Issue Paper Family Disputes Resolution : Care of and  Contact with Children, 2015 (Project 
100D)  
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author of this thesis has been practicing law for approximately 7 years after the 
implementation of the Act, thus she has experienced the challenges faced by unmarried 
fathers. It is important to the author to contribute to the realisation and enforcement of 
the rights of unmarried fathers as contained in the Children’s Act. The aim is to have 
this enforcement effected as practically and speedily as possible. 
10. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A substantial amount of articles have been written on the subject. However, different 
approaches have been used. The review starts with looking at the criticism of the 
terminology introduced in the Children’s Bill of 2003 until analysis of section 21 of the 
Act and more specifically the actual enforcement of the section and the challenges 
relating to such enforcement.    
The following authors have approached the topic as follows: 
Bonthuys19 first examined the Bill (as it then was) in respect of the terminology as well 
as the position of unmarried fathers without the financial means to give effect to their 
rights. 
She was of the opinion that irrespective of the good intentions of the drafters of the Bill 
to give unmarried fathers the opportunity to automatically obtain parental rights and 
responsibilities, that equality would become an issue. Another important aspect that she 
addressed in her article is the fact that the best interests of the child were not 
specifically mentioned in the Bill as well the failure to make provision for domestic 
                                                          
19 Bonthuys,E ‘Parental Rights and Responsibilities in the Children’s Bill 70D of 2003’ 2006 Stell LR  482 
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violence between the parents of the child.20 She further noted that because full parental 
rights could only be given to a married father, the Bill only applies to a heterosexual 
couple and thus lesbian partners would not be able to automatically acquire parental 
rights and responsibilities. She also believed that the specific sections of the Bill that 
deal with parental rights and responsibilities could be subjected to constitutional 
challenge on the basis of discrimination on sexual orientation.21 Bonthuys concluded 
with the issue of finances, and was of the opinion that a parent’s financial situation will 
have an effect on his or her parental obligations.22 
Mailula’s23 opinion, written before the Children’s Act of 2005, argues that the lack of 
children’s inherent rights to access, custody and guardianship of the natural fathers 
disregards the children’s rights, specifically their rights to parental care, dignity, equality 
and their best interests. This article is written from a children’s rights perspective. 
Zaal & Couzens24 in their article analyse the judgment handed down in Wheeler v 
Wheeler (2011) 2 ALL SA 459(KZP) by looking at the nature of the difficulties caused by 
the conceptualising of parental rights and responsibilities and the reasoning of the court. 
Mahlobogwane,25in his article looks at the effectiveness of the parenting plan and 
whether it in fact promotes the best interests of the child more specifically, whether it 
promotes the child’s right to grow up with a close relationship with both parents. This 
                                                          
20 Bonthuys,E (2006) 487 
21 Bonthuys,E (2006) 489 
22 Bonthuys,E (2006) 493 
23 Mailula, D ‘Taking children’s rights seriously: Access to, and custody and guardianship of, a child               
    born out of wedlock’ 2005 Codicillus 15 
24 Zaal, F Noel and Couzens, M ‘Articulating Common Law and Statutory Responsibilities’ 2012 TSAR     
   188 
25 Mahlobogwane, M ‘ Parenting Plans in terms of the Children’s Act: Serving the best interest of the           
    parent or the child?’ 2013 Obiter 218 
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article relates to the current provisions of the legislation and the effectiveness of 
parenting plans will be considered when making recommendations to render the 
legislation more effective.  
Sloth-Nielsen, Wakefield and Murungi26 discusses the acquisition of parental 
responsibilities in Kenya, South Africa and Namibia. They also looked at whether the 
current domestic laws of the aforesaid countries comply with international demands. 
Beyl,27 in her critical analysis of section 21 of the Children’s Act, in the chapter on 
parental rights and responsibilities, questions the commitment of unmarried fathers, 
specifically with reference to their automatic acquisition of parental rights and 
responsibilities. She further criticises section 21, in that it does not provide for the best 
interests of the child and also that the section focusses on the relationship between the 
biological mother and the unmarried father, and not on the relationship between the 
unmarried father and the child. She is further of the opinion that the child’s best interests 
should be considered when decisions are made to allow the unmarried father to acquire 
parental rights and responsibilities or not. 28 
In chapter 5 (five) of her thesis she focusses on the application of section 21 in practice. 
Specific reference is made to, amongst others, mediation, permanent life partnerships, 
“reasonable period” and “good faith”. She makes recommendations to assist with the 
interpretation of section 21 of the Act in chapter six of her thesis. 
                                                          
26 Sloth-Nielsen, J, Wakefield,L and Murungi, N ‘Does the Differential Criterion for Vesting Parental Rights   
    and Responsibilities of Unmarried Parents Violate International Law? A Legislative and Social Study of  
    Three African Countries’ 2011 Journal of African Law 203 
27 Beyl A,(2013) 
28 Beyl A,(2013) 23 
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This thesis will differ from that of Beyl, in that it will attempt to assist unmarried fathers in 
their quest to make the realisation of their rights possible, in other words to find more 
effective ways of enforcing their rights in a practical manner.  
11. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology utilised will be mainly desktop research, including  primary sources 
such as case law and legislation, international instruments and secondary sources such 
as books, internet sources and articles of South African and foreign academics. The 
writer conducted interviews with a number of role-players involved in the section 21 
application processes. The people who participated in the research come from different 
professions, but share a common interest; they deal or have dealt with the enforcement 
of parental rights and responsibilities of unmarried fathers on a daily basis.  Ninety 
percent of the informants has been in practice before the promulgation of the Act and 
have been involved in litigation relating to the Act. Amongst these individuals are a High 
court judge, a Children’s Court Magistrate, two family advocates, three practising 
attorneys, three advocates, a mediator and a clinical psychologist. The snowball 
research method was used with these interviews, with the view to obtain details of other 
experts in the field. 
12. LIMITATIONS OF STUDY 
This study will be limited to the legislation and procedures applicable to South Africa 
and recommendations will be made specifically in respect of the challenges faced by 
unmarried fathers in South Africa. 
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13. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Chapter 1: This chapter will introduce the background to the study as well as the 
significance of the research. 
Chapter 2: This chapter will provide the history of the parental rights and 
responsibilities of unmarried fathers in South African law.  
Chapter 3: This chapter will focus on the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 and the 
challenges faced by unmarried fathers in respect of exercising their 
parental rights and responsibilities, as well as the current measures and 
remedies available to assist unmarried fathers to exercise their parental 
rights and responsibilities with specific reference to access to justice. 
Chapter 4: This chapter will provide recommendations to the study and draw 
conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE HISTORY OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
UNMARRIED FATHERS IN SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
South African law had seen many developments in respect of the rights and 
responsibilities of unmarried fathers before the current regime introduced by the 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005. This chapter will discuss the different phases of legal 
development, starting first with the position under the common law and concluding with 
the current position under the Children’s Act.29 
2. PARENTAL AUTHORITY UNDER COMMON LAW 
“At common law an unmarried father had no relationship with his children born out of 
wedlock except that he was obliged to maintain them, in effect, he had no parental 
rights…”30  
Common law defined parental power31 as the rights, powers, duties and responsibilities 
of parents.32 The relationship between fathers and their children was defined by 
labelling the children as ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’.33  
                                                          
29 Act 38 of 2005 
30 Morei, NL ‘A Critical Analysis of the impact of the Constitution on the legal position of unmarried   
   fathers in South African law’ (LLD Dissertation 2008 North-West University, Mafikeng Campus) 11 
31 Today also known as parental rights and responsibilities 
32 Boberg PQR  “Law of Persons and the Family”  (1999) 312 
33 Boezaart T “Child Law in South Africa” (2009) 70 
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Parental authority and powers consisted of guardianship, custody and access.34 It was 
said that there existed no relationship between the unmarried father and his child except 
for his duty to maintain the child.35 
Unmarried fathers thus did not have an automatic right to guardianship and custody. 
Guardianship and custody automatically vested in the mother of a child born out of 
wedlock. In a situation where the mother of the child was herself a minor, guardianship 
automatically vested in her guardian or parent.36 A father of a child born out of wedlock 
was considered a stranger; hence he had no parental power.37 Neither the unmarried 
father nor his parents had parental power over the minor child even if the biological 
mother died.38 The biological father assumed the role of a third party and did not have 
any automatic rights to the child born out of wedlock.39 Unmarried fathers could only 
exercise these rights if it was in the best interests of the child and only by way of a court 
order granted by the High Court.40 
Parental authority was governed by the common law until the birth of the Guardianship 
Act.41 The Guardianship Act42 came into operation in 1993 and granted shared 
guardianship to both parents of a child born in wedlock; but guardianship vested only in 
                                                          
34 Sloth-Nielsen, J, Wakefield, L and Murungi, N ‘Does the Differential Criterion for Vesting Parental     
    Rights and Responsibilities of Unmarried Parents Violate International Law? A Legislative and    
    Social  Study of Three African Countries’ 2011 JAL 203 
35  Mailula, D ‘Taking children’s rights seriously: Access to, and custody and guardianship of, a child   
     born out of wedlock’ 2005 Codicillus 15 
36  Boberg PQR  (1999)  395 
37  Paizes JP, The Position of Unmarried Fathers in South Africa: An Investigation with Reference to a      
    Case Study (LLM Dissertation 2006 University of South Africa) 21 
38  Paizes JP (2006) 21 
39  Morei, NL (2008) 11 
40  Mailula,D  (2005) 18   
41  Fraser v Children’s Court Pretoria North and Others 1996 (BCLR) 1085 (CC) 
42  192 of 1993 
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the mother of a child born out of wedlock leaving the position of unmarried fathers 
unchanged.43 The different components of parental authority shall now be discussed. 
2.1 GUARDIANSHIP 
Guardianship was referred to in a narrow and a wide sense.44 In a narrow sense it 
referred to the capacity of a parent to act on behalf of a child in respect of administering 
his or her estate as well as acting on his or her behalf in judicial matters.45 Hutchison 
gave a detailed definition of guardianship in the broader sense and referred to it as “the 
authority which one person has over the person and/or property of another who suffers 
from an incapacity to manage his own affairs and/or person (such as a minor, insane 
person or prodigal) to the advantage of the latter”.46  
In the wider sense, guardianship can include elements of custody. Davel and Skelton 
referred to guardianship in the wider sense as custody and opined that it referred to a 
parent’s actual physical possession of a child and included caring for and supporting the 
child on a daily basis.47 
2.2 CUSTODY 
Cronje defines custody as: “…a person’s capacity physically to have the child with him 
or her and to control and supervise the child’s daily life.”48 The term custody was also 
inclusive of, amongst others, the following: possession of the child, physical welfare of a 
                                                          
43 Sloth-Nielsen, J, Wakefield, L and Murungi, N (2011) 203 
44 Davel CJ,Skelton A “Commentary on the Children’s Act”  3-5 
45 Cronje D, Heaton J “South African Family Law” (2004) 162 
46 Malete,MD Custody and Guardianship of children: A comparative perspective of the Bafokeng      
   customary law and South African common law (LLM Dissertation 1997 Rand Afrikaans University) 27 
47 Davel CJ,Skelton A “Commentary on the Children’s Act”  3-5 
48 Cronje D, Heaton J (2004) 163 
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child which entails the right and duty to nurture, maintain and raise the child as well as 
the duty to provide the child with adequate accommodation, food, clothing, medical 
support, and education and to support the child.49 
2.3 ACCESS  
Access was the second component of parental authority and was referred to as the right 
to maintain a personal relationship with the child as well as regular communication with 
the child.50 Cronje and Heaton defined access as “…the right and privilege to see, visit, 
spend time with, have contact with and enjoy the company of the child.”51 This means 
that the parent, who has access to the child at the time, is able to exercise those powers 
that the custodial parent would have exercised when the child is in the care of the 
custodial parent.52  These powers were deemed to include the right to make decisions 
regarding the health, safety, education and daily routine of the child.53  
The legal position of unmarried fathers became more troublesome and resulted in the 
need for legislation.54 A greater number of unmarried fathers wanted to exercise 
parental authority in respect of their children born out of wedlock and the common law 
did not make provision for this, hence the unanswered question was whether an 
unmarried father had an inherent right to access in respect of his child. Important court 
decisions brought to an extent a measure of relief for unmarried fathers. The significant 
decisions in these cases will now be discussed.  
                                                          
49 Malete,MD (1997) 25 
50 Davel CJ,Skelton A “Commentary on the Children’s Act”  3-5 
51 Cronje D, Heaton J (2004) 280 
52 Cronje D, Heaton J (2004) 280 
53 Cronje D, Heaton J (2004) 280 
54 Davel CJ,Skelton A “Commentary on the Children’s Act”  3-9 
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3.  JUDICIAL INTERVENTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION 
3.1  F V L AND ANOTHER  
In F V L and Another,55 the first and second respondents entered into marriage in 
December 1978. In January 1979, the child was born. The applicant alleged that he is 
the father of the child as he had sexual intercourse with the first respondent during April 
1978. The relationship between the applicant and the first respondent was terminated in 
May 1978. The second respondent confirmed that he too had sexual intercourse with 
the first respondent and accepted that he is the father of the child. The applicant 
brought an application to the court for an order declaring that he is the natural father of 
the child and also that he is entitled to reasonable access to the child. The Court 
considered the legal relationship between a natural father and an illegitimate child and 
said the following: “The natural father has a duty to maintain his illegitimate offspring 
and the child has a right of maintenance against the father. That is trite. It is also trite 
that in common law no other rights and duties between them were recognised.” The 
Court held that a father can only acquire parental authority in three ways which included 
birth from a valid marriage, legitimation and adoption. The Court found that the applicant 
did not acquire parental authority in any of the aforementioned ways and therefore had 
no prima facie rights of access to the child. 
 
 
                                                          
55 F v L and Another [1987] 4 ALL SA 308 (W) 
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3.2 F V B 
In the case of F v B56 the parties to the dispute had a child out of wedlock. The applicant 
has been a part of the child’s life since birth until the age of two years and four months, 
when the respondent entered into a marriage with another man. At the time of the 
marriage the respondent prevented the applicant’s access to the child. The applicant 
brought and application to the court for an order allowing him access to the child. The 
fact that the applicant did not have an inherent right of access with his child was not in 
dispute. The court however was of the opinion that the applicant does not have a right 
of access to the child, and that he will only be granted such access if strong compelling 
grounds exists that indicates that access would be in the best interests of the child.  The 
expert evidence confirmed the child may suffer psychological harm should the applicant 
be allowed to have access to the child. The court held that allowing the applicant access 
with the child would not be in the child’s best interests and refused the application.  
3.3 B V P 
In B v P,57 the applicant had a long relationship with his child and thus has been a part 
of the child’s life since the child’s birth. In 1989, the respondent refused to allow the 
applicant access to the child. The trial court referred to the principles applied in the 
cases of F v L58 and F v B59 and held that the reasons provided by the applicant were 
not compelling enough to convince the court to grant an order allowing the applicant 
access to the child.   
                                                          
56 F v B [1988] 4 ALL SA 397 (D) 
57 B v P [1991] 4 ALL SA 421 (T) 
58 [1987] 4 ALL SA 308 (W) 
59 [1988] 4 ALL SA 397 (D) 
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3.4 VAN ERK V HOLMER  
In Van Erk v Holmer,60 the applicant brought an application to the court granting him 
reasonable access to his child born out of wedlock.  At the first appearance the matter 
was referred to the Family Advocate for an investigation and recommendation. The 
recommendation was that the applicant should be granted certain defined rights of 
access to the child. The court accepted the recommendation and the agreement was 
made an order of court.  Van Zyl J held that no distinction should be made between 
legitimate and illegitimate children and that access should only be denied if it would be 
in violation of the best interests of the child. The court considered the preceding cases 
that dealt with the same issue and said the following: “In view of the aforegoing 
considerations I believe the time has indeed arrived for the recognition by our courts of 
an inherent right of access by a natural father to his illegitimate child. That such right 
should be recognised is amply justified by the precepts of justice, equity and 
reasonableness and by the demands of public policy. It should be removed only if the 
access should be shown to be contrary to the best interests of the child.”  
Subsequent to this court decision, the enactment of the Interim Constitution took place 
in 1993 and the Final Constitution in 1996.  The Constitution introduced many changes 
to our law, with the most significant change being the implementation of the Bill of 
Rights. Section 2861 of the Constitution gives independent recognition to the needs and 
                                                          
60 Van Erk v Holmer [1992] 4 ALL SA 345 (W) 
61 Section 28 of Act 108 of 1996 reads as follow: 
28.(1)  Every child has the right— 
      (a) to a name and a nationality from birth;  
      (b) to family care or parental care, or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family   
            environment; 
      (c)  to basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services;  
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best interests of children.62 Even though the rights contained in the Bill of Rights are not 
absolute and are subjected to the limitation clause, section 3663, it is applicable to all 
law.64 As a result of this development in South Africa, the courts placed great emphasis 
on the best interests of the child when faced with litigation regarding children. This 
application is illustrated in the following court case discussions. 
3.5  S V S 65 
In this case the applicant applied to the court for an order granting him rights of access 
to the child born out of a relationship between him and the respondent. The respondent 
was not in favour of the application as she believed that allowing the applicant access 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
      (d)  to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation; 
      (e)  to be protected from exploitative labour practices;  
      (f)  not to be required or permitted to perform work or provide services that— 
      (i) are inappropriate for a person of that child’s age; or  
(ii) place at risk the child’s well-being, education, physical or mental health or spiritual, moral or 
social development;  
(g)  not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, in which case, in addition to the rights a 
child  enjoys under   sections 12 and 35, the child may be detained only for the shortest 
appropriate period of time, and has the right to be— 
(i)kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and  
(ii)treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that take account of the child’s age;  
      (h)  to have a legal practitioner assigned to the child by the state, and at state expense, in civil    
           proceedings affecting the child, if substantial injustice would otherwise result; and 
       (i)  not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in times of armed conflict.  
      (2) A child’s best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.  
      (3) In this section “child” means a person under the age of 18 years. 
62 Bekink, M “Child Divorce” : A Break from Parental Responsibilities and Rights Due to the Traditional   
    Socio-Cultural Practices and Beliefs of the Parents 2012 PER (15)(1) 183 
63 Section 36 of Act 108 of 1996 reads as follows: 
   36.(1)The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the    
   extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on    
   human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— 
   (a)  the nature of the right; 
   (b)  the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
   (c)  the nature and extent of the limitation;  
   (d)  the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and  
   (e)  less restrictive means to achieve the purpose.  
   (2)  Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit   
    any  right entrenched in the Bill of Rights.  
64 Bekink, M (2012) 183 
65 S v S [1993] 3 ALL SA 754 (W) 
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would not be in the best interests of the child. The applicant informed the court that the 
he is asking for access, only, because he is paying maintenance for the child. The court 
disagreed with Justice Van Zyl in the Van Erk case. The court referred to the Van Erk 
judgment and held that: “The father’s duty to maintain stands whether it is good or bad 
that he has contact with the child. It is widely accepted that that neither the law nor the 
child or its mother owes the father anything in return.”66 The court held that it was not 
convinced that the scepticism of the respondent about what is in the child’s best 
interests was wrong. The application was dismissed.   
3.6 B V S 
 In the case of B v S,67 the appellant applied to the High Court for an order granting him 
access to his child.  After hearing the evidence, the trial court held that the appellant 
had no inherent rights of access. The trial court was of the opinion that the appellant’s 
papers did not quite make out a case indicating that compelling circumstances existed 
to convince the court that an order granting him access would be in the best interests of 
the child. The court confirmed the views of Spiro68 and Boberg 69 in that it upheld the 
view that because the unmarried father does not have parental power, and access is a 
component of such parental power, there exists no inherent right of access in respect of 
an unmarried father.70 As was the case with parental authority, an unmarried father 
could make an application to the High Court for an order authorising his right of access. 
The court was further of the opinion that access would be granted to an unmarried 
                                                          
66 S v S page 764 
67 B v S [1995] 4 SA ALL 392 (AD) 
68 Spiro E Law of Parent and Child 485 
69 Boberg PQR  (1999) 334 
70 Mailula, D,(2005) 19   
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father but he had to prove on a balance of probabilities that such access would be in the 
best interests of the child and that it would not interfere with the mother’s right to 
custody. The decisive factor would however be the best interests of the child.71 The trial 
court dismissed the application.  Two years after the judgment of the trial court, the 
appellant lodged an appeal to the Appellate division against the judgment of the trial 
court. The Appellate division, upon assessing the evidence, upheld the appeal in that it 
found that the trial court’s evaluation of the evidence was incorrect. The court was of the 
opinion that the “…it may well be that access will be in the child’s best interests and that 
he should not be disadvantaged by respondent’s refusal of access (if unjustified) or by 
the inadequacies inherent in forensic procedure.”72 The court referred the matter back 
to the trial court for oral evidence to be heard as well as the necessary investigations to 
be completed. 
3.7 Fraser v Children’s Court, Pretoria North and Others   
The first post-constitution matter before the Constitutional Court was Fraser v Children’s 
Court, Pretoria North and Others,73 Fraser had a child from a relationship that had 
ended at the time that the child was born. The mother of the child had decided to give 
the child up for adoption. Section 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act74 then in force provided 
that the adoption could take place without the consent of the unmarried father.  
Fraser applied to the High Court for an interdict preventing the child from being handed 
to the adoptive parents and seeking an order handing the child over to him. His 
                                                          
71 Mailula, D,(2005) 19 
72 B v S  406 
73 1996 (BCLR) 1085 (CC) 
74 Act 74 of 1983 
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applications were dismissed due to his lack of parental authority under the common law.  
After not receiving an opportunity to be heard by the Children’s Court, Fraser applied to 
have the identities of the adoptive parents disclosed, so that he could apply for an 
interdict preventing the removal of the child from South Africa.75 This application was 
also unsuccessful.  Fraser started review proceedings in the High Court and sought an 
order for the following relief: setting aside the adoption order, that he be allowed to be 
heard and participate in the adoption proceedings, and an order declaring the common 
law rule vesting guardianship in the mother of the child born out of wedlock inconsistent 
with the Constitution. 
The court held that the Children’s Court commissioner had acted grossly irregularly by 
not affording Fraser a proper hearing and the order was set aside. Section 18(4)(d) was 
found to be inconsistent with the interim constitution76 and the matter was referred to 
the Constitutional Court for determination.  
Section 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act,77 was declared unconstitutional because it 
discriminated unfairly against unmarried fathers on the basis of their gender and marital 
status and it was declared   inconsistent with the Interim Constitution in that it dispensed 
with the consent of the unmarried father for the adoption of an illegitimate child in all 
instances. Parliament was ordered to draft legislation that acknowledged the rights of 
unmarried fathers within two years of handing down the judgment.78 
                                                          
75 Fraser v Naude and Others 1997(2) SA 82 (W) 
76 Act 200 of 1993 
77 Act 74 of 1983 
78 Fraser v Children’s Court Pretoria North and Others 1996 (BCLR) 1085 (CC) 
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Naude, the biological mother of the child, took the matter on appeal to the Supreme 
Court of Appeal on the basis that the court a quo erroneously set aside the order 
granted by the Children’s Court. The Supreme Court of Appeal agreed with the court a 
quo in respect of the anonymity of the adoptive parents for purposes of preventing 
ongoing disputes even after the adoption. The court held that at the time of the 
application, the proposed amendment was not done yet and therefore section 18(4)(d) 
was in force and applicable to the case. The court further found no fault with the 
commissioner’s conduct and upheld the appeal, setting aside the order made by the 
court a quo, except the order in relation to the determination of the unconstitutionality of 
section 18(4) (d).79  
Fraser then  applied to the Constitutional Court for special leave to appeal against the 
Supreme Court of Appeal’s decision or  alternatively, direct access to the Constitutional 
Court. The court considered the best interests of the child and the possible 
consequences, should the appeal be granted. The court refused the application as 
sought by Fraser. 
The above court decisions reflects how the courts have dealt with the developments in 
respect of parental authority, the best interests of the child and the Constitutional rights 
related to children and parents, specifically unmarried fathers. However, not all 
individuals possess the capability to approach the courts and tribunals for assistance 
when disputes arise. Therefore, the Fraser decision resulted in the promulgation of the 
Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act 86 of 1997 and the Adoption 
Matters Amendment Act 56 of 1998.   
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4.  LEGISLATION REGULATING THE PARENT AND CHILD RELATIONSHIP 
4.1 CHILD CARE ACT 74 OF 1983 
This Act provided that in the event that the parents of a child are married, the consent of 
both parents was necessary for making the child available for adoption. In the situation 
where the child was “illegitimate”, only the consent of the mother, or her 
guardian/parent, where she was a minor, was required to put the child up for adoption.80 
Unmarried fathers had no say whatsoever, whether they had acknowledged paternity or 
not. This was based on the common law rule relating to guardianship outlined in the 
preceding section, as an unmarried father had no parental authority in respect of his 
child born out of wedlock. On the other hand, the same section placed the married 
father on equal footing as the child’s mother.81  
This Act was amended in 1996 to provide for the consent of the unmarried father in the 
adoption of his child.82 The purpose of the amendment was to give effect to the order 
granted in the Fraser decision as discussed in 3.7 above.  
A clear distinction was drawn between married and unmarried parents. In the event 
where the child was born in wedlock, the consent of both parents was required for the 
adoption to proceed. The Act83 also dispensed with the parental consent of a parent of a 
child born out of wedlock if the father failed to acknowledge himself as the father or if he 
failed to perform his parental duties in respect of the child and could not show good 
                                                          
80 S 18(4)(d) of Act 74 of 1983 
81 Section 18 (4)(d) of the Child Care Act  
82 Fraser v Naude and Another 1998 (11) BCLR 1357 (CC) 
83 Child Care Act 74 of 1983 
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cause for such failure.84  The consent of an unmarried father was also not required if he 
failed to respond to a section 19A85 notice within 14 days of receiving such notice.86  
4.2    NATURAL FATHERS OF CHILDREN BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK ACT 86 OF 
1997 
The South African Law Commission (now known as the South African Law Reform 
Commission) had been requested to do an investigation in 199487 with a view to drafting 
new legislation on the issue. The result of the investigation confirmed the correctness of 
the common law position, but the new proposals which emanated formed the basis of 
the Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act 86 of 1997, (hereinafter 
referred to as the Natural Father’s Act).88 This Act came into operation in 1998.  
The Natural Father’s Act specifically dealt with procedural fairness insofar as it related 
to the application procedures to be followed by an unmarried father who wanted to 
exercise his right to guardianship, access or custody in respect of his child born out of 
wedlock.89  In order for an unmarried father to exercise any rights in respect of his child, 
the Act provided for an application to a High Court for access, custody or guardianship, 
and for that court to make the final decision based on the best interests of the child. This 
Act was intended to improve the position of unmarried fathers in that it provided 
unmarried fathers an opportunity to seek the assistance of the court. The High Court 
was authorised to cause investigations to be done by the Office of the Family Advocate, 
                                                          
84 Boberg PQR  (1999)  445 
85 Section 19A of Act 74 of 1983  
86 Section 19A of Act 74 of 1983 
87 SALRC (Project 38) Report on the rights of a father in respect of his   illegitimate  child, 1994  
88 Davel CJ,Skelton A “Commentary on the Children’s Act”  3-9 
89 Cronje, D & Heaton, J (2004) 266 
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where it was deemed necessary and in the best interests of the child, and to further act 
upon the recommendations of the Office of the Family Advocate, where a matter was 
referred to their offices for a formal investigation.90 The factors that the court were to 
consider in an application  included amongst others, the relationship between the father 
and the child as well as the father’s commitment to the child in respect of the child’s 
well-being and maintenance.91 
The Act further authorised the court to make various orders including granting sole or 
joint guardianship to either parent, as well as to institute inquiries by the Office of the 
Family Advocate into the welfare of the child.92 However, this Act still did not place 
unmarried fathers on the same footing as mothers and married fathers.93 In fact ‘[t]he 
Act did not reverse the existing legal position pertaining to guardianship, care and 
contact. Basically, what it did was to definitively establish that such fathers did not have 
any rights or powers over children born out of wedlock.’94 
The Act failed to address the right of equality and the automatic acquisition of parental 
rights and responsibilities of unmarried fathers and placed greater emphasis on the best 
interests of the child, a factor which is of paramount importance. The consequence is 
that if the unmarried father failed to prove that his right to access, custody or 
guardianship in respect of his child was in the child’s best interests, he was not able to 
exercise this right.  
                                                          
90 S 2 (1)–(4) of Act 86 of 1997  
91 S 2(2) of Act 86 of 1997 
92 S 2(6) of Act 86 of 1997  
93 Boezaart T  (2009) 74 
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4.3 THE ADOPTION MATTERS AMENDMENT ACT 56 OF 1998 
The Adoption Matters Amendment Act95 was promulgated in 1998. The purpose of the 
Act was: ‘To amend the Child Care Act 74 of 1983, so far as to simplify the procedure 
for the granting of legal representation for children in children’s court proceedings; to 
provide for the rights of certain natural fathers where the adoption of their children born 
out of wedlock has been proposed and for notice to be given (notice  was only given to 
those fathers who acknowledged themselves as the natural fathers and whose 
whereabouts were made known by the biological mother of the child);96 to amend the 
Natural Fathers of Children Born Out of Wedlock Act 86 of 1997, so as to consolidate 
the law on adoption under the Child Care Act 74 of  1983; and to amend the Births and 
Deaths Registration Act 1992, so far as to afford a father of a child born out of wedlock 
the opportunity to record his acknowledgement of paternity and his particulars in the 
birth registration of the child; and to provide for matter connected herewith.’97 The Act 
addressed procedural issues as well as issue of consent in respect of the adoption of a 
child born out of wedlock.98 
The amendments required that the consent of both parents be given when a child is 
given up for adoption, irrespective of whether the child was born out of wedlock or not.99 
In 1997 the legislator recognised that the law in its current form contained no provision 
for the constitutional right to dignity and equality. This led to the investigation conducted 
                                                          
95 Act 56 of 1998 
96 Morei, NL (2008) 14 
97  Preamble of  Act 56/1998 
98  Schäfer L, The Legal Position of Unmarried Fathers in the Adoption after Fraser v Children’s Court    
    Pretoria North No 1997 (2) SA 26(CC): Towards a Constitutionally Sound Adoption Statute (LLM    
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by the South African Law Reform Commission (hereinafter referred to as the 
SALRC).The SALRC had to review the Child Care Act and make recommendations to 
reform this area of the law.100 The investigation was done by way of research papers in 
specific areas of the law and included amongst others the parent and child relationship.  
4.4  RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN LAW COMMISSION 
In December 2002, after extensive research, opinions and workshops, the SALRC 
presented its final recommendations and findings as well as a draft Children’s Bill to the 
Minister of Social Development and the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee.101 The 
SALRC made a number of recommendations in respect of the rights and duties of 
unmarried fathers. These recommendations will be discussed briefly to give a short 
summation with regard to what steered the birth of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005.  
4.4.1   ACQUISITION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
The SALRC recommended that the statute provide for a procedure to enable an 
unmarried father to acquire parental responsibilities by entering into an agreement with 
the mother of the child.102  Such agreement was to be done in a prescribed form and 
registered with the appropriate forum in the prescribed manner.103  
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Further it was recommended that exceptional cases should exist wherein this would not 
be possible and open to unmarried fathers. These circumstances included a situation 
where the child was conceived as a result of rape or incest.104 
In the event where the agreement was not possible, the SALRC recommended that the 
father without parental rights and responsibilities be given an opportunity to obtain 
parental responsibilities by making an application to the court, and satisfying the court, 
that granting such parental responsibilities will be in the best interests of the child.105 
Another recommendation was that certain categories of fathers automatically obtain 
parental rights and responsibilities. These categories were: 
“(a) the father who has acknowledged paternity of the child and who has supported 
the child within his financial means; 
  (b) the father who, subsequent to the child’s birth, has cohabitated with the child’s 
mother for a period or periods which amount to not less than one year; 
  (c) the father who, with the informed consent of the mother, has cared for the child 
on a regular basis for a period or periods which amount to not less than one year, 
whether or not he has cohabitated with the mother of the child.”106 
The SALRC received various comments in respect of the above recommendations. 
Included in these comments were views that no unmarried father should automatically 
have parental rights and responsibilities and another organisation was of the view that 
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no distinction should be made between mothers and unmarried fathers.107 While 
acknowledging that these various points of views would continue to exist, the SALRC 
was of the belief that its recommendation was pragmatic, and legally and 
constitutionally sound. Its final recommendations in respect of married fathers were: 
“the unmarried father of a child should in certain defined circumstances automatically 
obtain parental rights and responsibilities in respect of his child. The defined 
circumstances are where the father has lived with the mother for at least one year after 
the child’s birth, where the father has cared for the child with the mother’s consent for at 
least a year, upon confirmation by a court of a parental rights and responsibilities 
agreement, or where so ordered by the court.”108 
“Where the biological father does not have parental rights and responsibilities in respect 
of a child, provision is made for the father to obtain parental rights and responsibilities 
by agreement with the mother or another person who has such parental rights and 
responsibilities in respect of the child concerned. Other categories of persons such as 
the partner in a domestic relationship will have to follow the court application route and 
will not be able to simply conclude agreements to this effect with the mother of the 
child.”109 
4.4.2    PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND RIGHTS AGREEMENTS 
As was discussed under paragraph 4.4.1, the SALRC recommended that unmarried 
fathers acquire parental rights and responsibilities by entering into an agreement with 
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the mother of the child. Provision was also made in the discussion paper for partners in 
a domestic relationship. These agreements were referred to as parental rights and 
responsibilities agreements.110 The form of the agreement was to be prescribed in the 
regulations to the statute and termination would only be possible by means of a court 
order.  No submissions were received from the stakeholders on this recommendation. 
The SALRC, after reconsidering, decided that only the father of the child should be 
allowed to enter into such an agreement and not just any person with an interest in the 
child. The possible abuse by interested parties of the guardianship provisions to avoid 
the adoption requirements was the purpose of making these agreements exclusive to 
fathers.111 
These agreements were to be registered with the registrar of the Children’s and Family 
Court.112 The abovementioned recommendations formed the basis of the Children’s Bill 
which was introduced to Parliament. However, the proposals were changed quite 
substantially during the Parliamentary process.  
The Draft Bill was generally welcomed by the public.113 To give effect to the provisions 
of the Draft Bill required the cooperation of other governmental departments, with the 
Department of Social Development as the principal Department.114 In 2003 the 
Department of Social Development commenced negotiations with the other affected 
Departments.115 This was shortly before the general elections and this affected the 
                                                          
110 SALRC (2002) 72 
111 SALRC (2002)  72 
112 SALRC (2002)  73 
113 Davel CJ,Skelton A “Commentary on the Children’s Act” 1-13 
114 Davel CJ,Skelton A “Commentary on the Children’s Act” 1-13 
115 Davel CJ,Skelton A “Commentary on the Children’s Act” 1-13 
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abilities of the Departments to effectively give their required attention to the 
negotiations. The result of these negotiations was a new Draft Bill that was significantly 
different to the draft of the SALRC in that many provisions and complete chapters were 
removed and some diluted.116  The second Draft Bill was published for comments and 
many of the submissions received asked for the deleted versions to be re-inserted. The 
Draft Bill was sent to the State Law Advisers before reading the submissions or 
incorporating it into the Bill. The Draft Bill was certified by the State Law advisers.117 
The failure of the Department to consider the submissions received from the public 
resulted in a long and complicated Parliamentary process. The State Law Advisers 
certified the Draft Bill into two bills.118 The first Draft Bill was finally passed by the 
National Assembly in December 2005 and passed by the President as the Children’s 
Act 38 of 2005.119 The next discussion will focus on the provisions contained in the 
Children’s Act 38 of 2005 that ultimately were adopted. 
4.5. CHILDREN’S ACT 38 OF 2005 
The Children’s Act 38 of 2005 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) brought about drastic 
changes to the position of unmarried fathers and their rights in respect of their children. 
The Act makes provision for either full or specific parental responsibilities or rights in 
respect of a child. The Act clearly defines parental responsibilities and rights in Section 
18(2).120  
                                                          
116 Davel CJ,Skelton A “Commentary on the Children’s Act” 1-13 
117 Davel CJ,Skelton A “Commentary on the Children’s Act” 1-13  
118 Davel CJ,Skelton A “Commentary on the Children’s Act” 1-13 
119 Davel CJ,Skelton A “Commentary on the Children’s Act” 1-15 
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The Act draws a strong distinction between the acquisition of parental responsibilities 
and rights of married and unmarried fathers. In respect of the married fathers, 
acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights is automatic if they fulfil one of the 
requirements mentioned in section 20121 which are that he either is married to the 
mother of the child or alternatively has been married to the mother of the child at the 
time of conception, birth or any time between conception and birth. 
Section 20 of the Act places the married father on an equal footing with the biological 
mother. Hence in the event of divorce or separation of the biological parents after the 
birth of the child, or during the pregnancy, the father retains his full parental 
responsibilities and rights. 
On the other hand, unmarried fathers need to fulfil the requirements set out in section 
21 before they can acquire parental responsibilities and rights. In the event where the 
father does not fall within the categories mentioned in section 20 of the Act, provision is 
made for him in section 21.  
Section 21 of the Act was aimed at improving the position of unmarried fathers in 
relation to their parental rights and responsibilities. The objective was to move closer 
towards equal treatment between married and unmarried fathers. As discussed in this 
chapter earlier, under Common law, unmarried fathers had no inherent rights of access 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
  ‘18 (2) the parental responsibilities and rights that a person may have in respect of a child include          
   the responsibility and the right- 
   (a) to care for the child; 
   (b) to maintain contact with the child; 
   (c) to act as guardian of the child; and  
  (d) to contribute to the maintenance of the child.’ 
121 Section 20 of Act 38 of 2005  
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with their children. Beyl122 opined that the Act provided unmarried fathers with a leap 
towards improved rights. The court in Bosch v Van Vuuren123 referred to Davel and 
Skelton’s Commentary on the Children’s Act and stated: “the section is based on the 
premise that if a child’s unmarried father meets certain requirements, he acquires 
exactly the same parental responsibilities and rights as the child’s mother…”124 
Section 21 of the Act reads as follows: 
‘21. (1) The biological father of a child who does not have parental responsibilities and 
rights in respect of the child in terms of section 20 (1), acquires full parental 
responsibilities and rights in respect of the child- 
(a) if at the time of the child’s birth he is living with the mother in a permanent life-
partnership; or 
(b) if he, regardless of whether he has lived or is living with the mother – 
(i) consents to be identified or successfully applies in terms of section 26 to 
be identified as the child’s father or pays damages in terms of customary 
law; 
(ii) contributes or has attempted in good faith to contribute to the child’s 
upbringing for a reasonable period; and  
                                                          
122 Beyl A, Critical  Analysis of Section 21 of the Children’s  Act 38 of 2005 with specific reference to   
      the Parental Responsibilities and Rights of unmarried fathers (LLM 2013 University Pretoria) 42 
123 Bosch v Van Vuuren 06504/2012(SGCH)(unreported judgment)  
124 Bosch v Van Vuuren para 9 
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(iii) contributes or has attempted in good faith to contribute towards expenses 
in connection with the maintenance of the child for a reasonable period. 
(2)  this section does not affect the duty of a father to contribute towards the 
maintenance of the child.’ 
An unmarried father that does not automatically acquire parental rights and 
responsibilities in terms of section 21(1) (a) of the Act, needs to prove that he satisfies 
all the requirements of section 21(1) (b). The onus is placed on the unmarried father to 
prove compliance.  Initially when the Act came into operation, the requirements of 
section 21(1) (b) raised many questions. These related to whether all the requirements 
contained in the section should be satisfied for an unmarried father to acquire parental 
rights and responsibilities. The question was subsequently interpreted by the courts to 
include all three requirements.  
The court in Botha v Dreyer 125 stated:  
“This provision is a significant advance upon the common law and the provisions of the 
Natural Fathers of Children Born out of Wedlock Act 86 of 1987 (which the Act repeals), 
neither of which afforded an unmarried father any automatic rights in respect of the 
child. Under the previous dispensation an unmarried father could obtain parental 
responsibilities and rights only if a court determined that it was in the best interests of 
the child. That has now changed. The unmarried father has automatic rights provided 
he meets the requirements of section 21(1) (a) or (b).” 
                                                          
125 Botha v Dreyer [2008] ZAGPHC 395 (unreported judgment) 
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The author is thus in agreement with the court in Botha v Dreyer in that the position of 
the unmarried father has been ameliorated to the extent that unmarried fathers can now 
acquire full parental rights and responsibilities automatically in certain circumstances,126 
as opposed to the position under the Natural Fathers Act, where automatic acquisition 
was not allowed at all and all decisions rested on the courts.  
In addition to the provisions of section 21 of the Act, in the event that an unmarried 
father do not qualify for acquisition in terms of section 21, he can make an application to 
the court to confer contact, care127 or guardianship128 upon him129 and have certain 
rights and responsibilities conferred upon him by means of a parental responsibilities 
and rights agreement as provided for in section 22 of the Act.130  
 In terms of section 22 of the Act, unmarried fathers can enter into a parental 
responsibilities and rights agreement with the biological mother of the child. Such 
agreement must be drafted in a prescribed form. It is also a requirement that before 
registration of the agreement, the Office of the Family Advocate or the relevant court 
must be satisfied that such agreement is in the best interests of the child.131 Further, the 
Act prescribes that such agreement only takes effect if it is registered with the Office of 
the Family Advocate or if it had been made an order of court by the High Court, 
Regional Court or the Children’s Court.132  
                                                          
126 Boezaart T (2009) 74 
127 S 23 of Act 38 of 2005 
128 S 24 of Act 38 of 2005 
129 Boezaart T (2009) 78 
130 Boezaart T (2009) 78 
131 S22(5) of Act 38 of 2005 
132 S22(6)(a) of Act 38 of 2005  
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A clear distinction should also be drawn between acquisition and exercise of parental 
rights and responsibilities. The Act does not specifically indicate or prescribe how the 
exercise of parental rights and responsibilities should take place after such rights have 
been acquired by an unmarried father. The most imperative factor, “the best interest of 
the child”, does not feature when dealing with the acquisition part, but only comes into 
consideration with the exercising of some aspect of these rights.133 
5.  CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CHILDREN’S ACT 
5.1  RIGHT TO EQUALITY 
Sloth Nielsen, Wakefield and Murungi opined that “Section 21 of the Children’s Act 
attempts to promote a greater level of formal equality between married and unmarried 
parents, provided that certain criteria are met”.134 These requirements were set out in 
the discussion on the Act in the preceding section. However, irrespective of the 
increased recognition of the beneficial role that an unmarried father can play in his 
child’s life, the common law position remains unchanged in that many unmarried fathers 
still do not automatically acquire parental rights and responsibilities like the mother of 
the child.135 This raises the question as to whether the Act is in fact aimed at equality in 
respect of both parents. The right to equality is provided for in section 9 of the 
Constitution. Section 9(3) specifically provides that the: “state may not unfairly 
discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, including 
                                                          
133 Boezaart T (2009) 79 
134 Sloth-Nielsen, J, Wakefield, L and Murungi, N (2011) 220 
135 Louw, A ‘The Constitutionality of a Biological Father’s Recognition As A Parent’ (2013) 13 PER 156 
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race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status…including birth.”136The acquisition of 
parental rights and responsibilities constitutes an infringement on the right to equality of 
both parents in that it discriminates against both parents on the basis of sex, gender 
and marital status in terms of section 9(3) of the Constitution.137 All constitutional rights 
are subject to the limitation clause contained in section 36 of the Constitution.  
According to Louw, “it would seem as though the limitation of the parents’ right to 
equality is currently justified by the child’s overriding right to parental care, which in 
terms of the best interests’ standard is currently limited to committed parental care…”138  
She further opined that the arbitrary automatic acquisition of parental rights and 
responsibilities of mothers and the fact that unmarried fathers must still prove their 
worth is a serious weakness of the Act.139 In Fraser v The Children’s Court, Pretoria 
North and Others140 the Constitutional Court had to determine the constitutionality of 
section 18(4)(d) of the Child Care Act. At the time the Interim Constitution was the 
applicable law. The court stated the following with regard to the limitation of 
fundamental rights: 
“Consistent with this repeated commitment to equality are the conditions upon which 
there can be any justifiable limitation of fundamental rights in terms of section 33 of the 
Constitution. In order for such a limitation to be constitutionally legitimate it must be 
“justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality”.141 
Therefore, the author agrees with Louw in that the Act is indeed aimed at equality. The 
                                                          
136 Louw AS, Acquiring Parental Responsibilities and Rights (LLD Dissertation 2009 University Pretoria)   
    476 
137 Louw, A (2013) 161  
138 Louw, A (2013) 195  
139 Louw, A (2009) 476 
140 1997 (2) SA 261 (CC) 
141 1998 (11) BCLR 1357 (CC) para 20 
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limitation on the parents’ right to equality is justifiable, because, their right to equality is 
justified by the child’s prevailing constitutional right to parental care as contained in 
section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution.142  
5.2 UNFAIR DISCRIMINATION AGAINST UNMARRIED FATHERS 
Section 9 of the Constitution143 is not aimed at achieving formal equality.144 Section 9 
(2) of the Constitution allows for remedial equality.145 In other words, the section allows 
for measures to be taken to promote the achievement of equality. These measures are 
also referred to as restitutionary measures, better known as affirmative action.146 The 
court in Minister of Finance and Other v Van Heerden (2004) (6) SA 121 (CC) stated 
that the enquiry into whether the measure falls within the ambit of section 9 (2) of the 
Constitution is threefold and described the test as follows: “ The first yardstick relates to 
whether the measure targets persons or categories of persons who have been 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination; the second is whether the measure is designed 
to protect or advance such persons or categories of persons; and the third requirement 
is whether the measure promotes the achievement of equality.” These measures are 
designed to protect or advance persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination.147  
The court in Harksen v Lane NO and Other (1998) (1) SA 300 (CC) outlined the 
questions to be answered to determine unfair discrimination as the following: 
                                                          
142 Louw, A (2013) 195 
143 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 
144  Louw, A (2009) 150 
145  Harksen v Lane NO and Other (1998) CC 324 
146  Minister of Finance and Other v Van Heerden (2004) para 28 
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1.  does the discrimination amount to discrimination? 
2. If so, was it unfair? 
3. If so, can it be justified in terms of section 36148 of the Constitution?149  
Various authors have different opinions with respect to the applicability of the limitation 
clause. However the Constitutional Court has nevertheless on each occasion when it 
has found a violation of the equality clause, also considered the effect of the limitation 
clause.150  
Louw is of the opinion that due to a mother’s ability to give birth, she is assigned with 
parental rights and responsibilities and is also presumed to act in the best interests, of 
the child.151 On the other hand, fathers are assessed on their level of commitment to the 
mother or the child. 
She further draws a clear distinction between the discrimination on grounds of gender 
and sex in relation to mothers, and discrimination on the basis of lack of commitment in 
respect of mothers and fathers.152 This discrimination according to Louw is deemed to 
be unfair unless it can be justified in terms of section 36153 of the Constitution.154 She 
                                                          
148 Section 36 of the Constitution  reads as follows: 
36. (1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of general application to the 
extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
(2) Except as provided in subsection (1) or in any other provision of the Constitution, no law may limit any 
right entrenched in the Bill of Rights. 
149 Louw,A (2009) 151 
150 Louw,A (2009) 152 
151 Louw,A (2009) 153 
152 Louw,A (2009) 156 
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further argues that the discrimination based on lack of commitment is an unspecified 
ground and therefore will have to be established as unfair.155  
In applying the test on whether the remedial measures fall within the ambit of section 
9(2) and the test to determine whether the discrimination is fair as discussed above, it 
can be concluded that by granting unmarried fathers parental rights and responsibilities, 
remedial measures were used to achieve equality between mothers and unmarried 
fathers, but not between married and unmarried fathers. Married fathers automatically 
acquire parental rights and responsibilities as opposed to unmarried fathers who need 
to comply with certain requirements. Hence, the author agrees with Louw, but is of the 
opinion that the discrimination against unmarried fathers on the basis of marital status is 
also unfair. 
6. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF SECTION 21 
The fact that the provisions of section 21 do not confer parental rights and 
responsibilities on all fathers probably satisfies those who advocate for the automatic 
rights of unmarried fathers, however those that believe that mothers and unmarried 
fathers should not be treated equally because of the child care burden on the mother, 
remain disgruntled.156 Section 21(1) (b) contains three subsections with the word “and” 
linking subsection (ii) and (iii). Skelton is of the view that the three subsections have a 
cumulative effect and therefore the unmarried father must comply with all the 
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requirements of the section.157 The court in KLVC v SDI stated the following in respect 
of the interpretation of section 21(b): “…we know that an interpretation of the section 
requires a consideration of the language, read in context and having regard to the 
purpose of the provision and the background to its emergence and incorporation in 
law.”158 The court thus confirmed Skelton’s view that the subsections have a cumulative 
effect. 
Potential problems were pointed out by Davel and Skelton.159 The first one is the phrase 
“permanent life partnership” used in section 21(1)(a) and secondly the phrase 
“reasonable period” used in section 21(1)(b) (ii) and (iii). The Act does not give 
definitions or express meanings of these two terms.160  Life partnership in the traditional 
sense refers to parties living together and not being married.161 The word “permanent” 
is open to interpretation and can mean that the relationship is either stable or 
everlasting. No time period is used to define the word “permanent”, hence it might be 
difficult to determine whether the relationship is permanent or not. 
The second problematic phrase is “reasonable period”. To determine what a reasonable 
period is can be very problematic, and might be viewed differently by the parties 
involved.162 Consequently, how the phrase is interpreted will differ from one set of 
parents to another. 
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The third problem is the fact that the section speaks about “a contribution towards the 
maintenance of the child”. This contribution need not be regular, and in the event where 
the unmarried father only contributes on an occasional basis, he would still be entitled to 
qualify for parental rights and responsibilities.163  
Fourthly, with respect to the payment of damages in terms of customary law as referred 
to in section 21(1) (b)(i), no clarity is given as to what type of payment is acceptable.164 
In view of the uncertainty, payment can be made by means of money or cattle.  
Fifthly, section 21(3)(b) provides for mediation when a dispute arises between the 
biological mother and the unmarried father.165 By interpreting the section it can be 
assumed that the parties thus do not have a choice but to attempt mediation first, before 
resorting to the court for assistance.166 The High Court, as the upper guardian of all 
minors, can however still be approached before mediation, if such action is in the best 
interests of the child.167  
In assessing the problems as mentioned above, it can be assumed that unmarried 
fathers could still be experiencing difficulties in exercising their rights contained in 
section 21 of the Act.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
The developments in South African law as reflected in this chapter provide a clear 
indication as to how the status of unmarried fathers has changed from a position of no 
rights to a position of conditional rights. The law now provides for the automatic 
acquisition as well as conditional acquisition in respect of unmarried fathers. The 
emphasis of the courts’ reasoning still founded upon the best interests of the child. The 
question that remains unanswered is how parental rights and responsibilities, once 
acquired, are to be exercised? How do the legal implications of section 21 of the 
Children’s Act affect this process? Is it now practically possible for unmarried fathers to 
indeed exercise their parental rights and responsibilities? The following chapter will 
explore the practical challenges that unmarried fathers are experiencing in an attempt to 
exercise their parental rights and responsibilities, once acquired.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH INTO THE EFFECTIVENESS AND ENFORCEABILITY OF 
SECTION 21 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Unmarried fathers have been battling to acquire parental rights and responsibilities for 
decades. This however changed seven years ago with the promulgation of the 
Children’s Act168 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). As discussed in chapter two, the 
Act provides for automatic acquisition of parental rights and responsibilities by 
unmarried fathers who were living with the mother at the time of a child’s birth as well as 
acquisition if the requirements of section 21 (b)169 are complied with. Acquisition, 
whether automatic or by means of the requirements of section 21(b), has been 
researched and written on comprehensively, but enforceability remains challenging. The 
author is of the opinion that the battle for most unmarried fathers starts with the quest to 
establish their parental rights and responsibilities and continues long after the 
acquisition of such rights and responsibilities. The exercise of these rights seems to be 
as challenging as the actual acquisition. The purpose of this research is to investigate 
the pre- and post-acquisition phase from a practical perspective. This chapter will 
explore what the challenges are that unmarried fathers face in an attempt to acquire 
and effectively enforce their rights as provided for in the Act.  Answers to this can only 
be provided by people who are actively involved in these types of disputes. Therefore, 
the author conducted interviews and circulated questionnaires to legal practitioners, 
presiding officers and other role-players involved in parental rights and responsibilities 
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disputes. The questions posed during the interviews related to the acquisition of 
parental rights and responsibilities, enforcement of such rights after acquisition, the 
effectiveness of parental rights and responsibilities agreements as well as difficulties 
relating to the interpretation of the Act. The recurring challenges were amongst others, 
interpretation of the legislation, access to justice as well as the role of the mother of the 
child specifically in relation to parental alienation. The methodology utilised to obtain this 
information will now be discussed. 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
The research is aimed at exploring the enforceability of parental rights and 
responsibilities. Therefore, qualitative research was the best method of obtaining the 
necessary information. The author made use of organised interviews and 
questionnaires to achieve this goal. The questionnaire will be attached to this 
dissertation as an appendix. The people who participated in the research come from 
different professions, but share a common interest; they deal or have dealt with the 
enforcement of parental rights and responsibilities of unmarried fathers on a daily basis.  
Ninety percent of the informants has been in practice before the promulgation of the Act 
and have been involved in litigation relating to the Act. In addition the author considered 
secondary sources consisting of books, internet sources, academic and journal articles. 
The author obtained ethical clearance from the University of the Western Cape 
Research Committee at the end of May 2015.The research was done over a period of 
three months. A total of six interviews were done. These interviewees also completed 
the questionnaire. Approximately 15 questionnaires were sent to role-players. 
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Unfortunately only six were completed and returned to the author. The majority of the 
persons who were contacted did not display an interest in the topic at all. Twelve 
individuals participated in the research. Amongst these individuals are a High Court 
judge, a Children’s Court Magistrate, two family advocates, three practising attorneys, 
three advocates, a mediator and a clinical psychologist. The research was conducted 
with practitioners mainly practising in the Cape Town CBD area. As the research neared 
completion, the South African Law Reform Commission released an Issue Paper on 23 
February 2016, which confirmed the author’s findings as will be discussed in this 
chapter.170 A discussion on the challenges as obtained through the interviews will follow 
in the next paragraph. 
3. CHALLENGES FACED BY UNMARRIED FATHERS TO ENFORCE THEIR 
PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
3.1  INTERPRETATION OF LEGISLATION 
In assessing and compiling the information obtained from the informants, the author can 
confirm that the majority of the informants agree that certain sections in the Act create 
confusion. A discussion on these sections will now follow to illustrate how their 
interpretation contributes to the challenges experienced by unmarried fathers. 
 As legislation is more often than not written in ways that is not understood by the lay 
person, unmarried fathers often depend on the assistance of legal practitioners and the 
courts to assist them with enforcing their rights. Section 21 of the Act provides for 
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automatic and conditional acquisition of parental rights and responsibilities. A full 
discussion of the section appears in chapter two and will thus not be repeated herein. 
The following discussion will focus on the problematic terms found in section 21 of the 
Act, as elicited during the interviews. 
3.1.1  INTERPRETATION OF “LIFE-PARTNERSHIP” 
Heaton171 defines “life partnership” in the narrow sense as: “A permanent life 
relationship, analogous to marriage, comprising two persons who, even though they are 
legally competent to marry one another, live together without : a) having ever attempted 
to marry one another in terms of the Marriage Act, the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act 120 of 1998 or the Civil Union Act;…”172  
The term “permanent life partnership” as contained in Section 21(a) of the Act is one of 
the greatest issues and challenges that courts and legal practitioners are struggling 
with. A great uncertainty exists as to what “permanent life-partnership” means.173 The 
Act does not provide a definition of the term; therefore the burden is on the courts to 
make a determination on facts which are presented to them. The legislator’s failure to 
define what a “permanent life-partnership” is places the burden on the unmarried father 
to prove to the court that the relationship or life-partnership he had with the mother of 
the child qualifies as a “permanent life-partnership”. As a result the matter is often 
postponed numerous times before a conclusion is found. The court is then faced with an 
extra task of determining the status of the relationship between the mother and the 
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unmarried father. This absorbs court hours that could have been utilised to assist other 
unmarried fathers with similar problems. Boezaart174 is of the opinion that the 
“permanent life-partnership” is a subjective matter. She opined that the claim by the 
unmarried father that the relationship was indeed a “permanent life partnership” may be 
disputed by the mother who might say that the parties had no intention that the 
relationship would be permanent.175 The court in FS v JJ 2011 (3) SA 126 (SCA), in 
determining the existence of a permanent life partnership, held that because the 
unmarried father and the child’s deceased mother lived together and had the intention 
of entering into a marriage, there was enough proof that they were involved in a 
permanent life partnership.  
The failure of the legislator to include a definition of “permanent life-partnership” leads to 
different interpretations of the term. The consequence is that there will never be a 
uniform definition or description of what the term stands for, as the interpretation will 
differ from one court to another. In the absence of a statutory definition of “permanent 
life-partnership”, the term will continuously be misinterpreted or individuals will add their 
own meaning to it.  This not only frustrates the rights of the unmarried father, but it also 
adds to the already overburdened court systems.   
3.1.2  INTERPRETATION OF “CONTRIBUTION FOR A REASONABLE PERIOD”  
In respect of terminology, another term that creates confusion is “reasonable period” of 
contribution towards the maintenance or upbringing of the child in terms of Section 21 
(b) (ii) and (iii). The meaning of “reasonable period” is open to interpretation. A 
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reasonable period can be anything from two days to two years. It can be interpreted to 
be contribution in respect of the last few months before the child’s birth until six months 
thereafter, or it could be contribution only after the child’s birth. What is reasonable will 
depend on the circumstances and the needs of the child. The contributions made by an 
unmarried father are often viewed differently by the parties involved. It is possible for the 
mother of the child to dispute how and when the unmarried father contributed. She 
could also argue that any contributions were only paid in respect of her own 
maintenance and not towards the upbringing of the child.  One informant is of the view 
that the term “reasonable period” in the context of the Act is vague and is the cause of 
many disputes.  Once again, the onus of proof lies on the unmarried father. These 
complications often cause the unmarried father to abandon the battle and suspend all 
attempts until the child reaches an age at which he or she can decide whether or not he 
or she want contact with him. These disputes are time consuming and expensive. 
 In I v C and Another,176 the mother of the child left the country without communicating 
this decision with the father of the child. On receiving an application in terms of the 
Hague Convention, the English Court wanted to know whether it was lawful of the 
mother to change the child’s residence to Wales without the father’s consent.  The 
South African Court considered the conduct and contributions by the unmarried father 
before the child was removed from the country to determine whether he complied with 
the requirements of section 21 (b) of the Act.  The court referred to the terms “good faith 
contributions”, contributions and upbringing for a reasonable period as follows: “These 
are elastic concepts and permit a range of considerations culminating in a value 
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judgment as to whether what was done could be said to be a contribution or a good faith 
attempt at contributing to the child’s upbringing over a period which, in the 
circumstances is reasonable.” The court held that the father met each of the 
requirements in section 21 (b) in the four months before the child left the country and 
therefore acquired parental rights and responsibilities. 
The court in Steadman v Landman177 considered the conduct of the unmarried father to 
determine whether his contribution was reasonable. In this case the parties were 
cohabiting in both England and South Africa. The applicant left London shortly after he 
was informed of the pregnancy. He was reluctant to become a father and urged the 
respondent to terminate the pregnancy. He undertook to go back to London when the 
child was born. The respondent came back to South Africa after the child was born. 
During this period the child’s paternal grandparents and extended family had regular 
contact with the child. The applicant however only saw the child intermittently. After the 
birth of the child the applicant emphasised to the respondent that he wanted to play an 
active role in the child’s life. He asked for a list of expenses of the child but never 
contributed towards maintenance at any stage. The respondent then left South Africa 
for London, but informed the applicant that she was going to Thailand. This resulted in 
an application before the court to prevent the removal of the child from South Africa in 
terms of the Hague Convention. In assessing whether the applicant has acquired 
parental rights and responsibilities in terms of section 21(b) of the Act, the court found 
that he hardly contributed towards the child’s upbringing and also that his alleged 
                                                          
177 Steadman v Landman  229994/2010 (WCHC) (unreported judgment) 
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contribution towards maintenance was less convincing. This was based on the fact that 
the applicant had the banking details of the respondent but still did not pay anything in 
respect of maintenance. The court referred to the Davel and Skelton Commentary on 
the Children’s Act and quoted the following: “where the father has contributed to the 
child’s upbringing for a reasonable period is not a straightforward matter. For the point 
at which a period becomes reasonable is a relative matter on which the child’s parents’ 
view may differ.”178  The court was not convinced that the applicant contributed towards 
the child’s maintenance in good faith and held that the applicant did not acquire parental 
rights and responsibilities in terms of section 21(b) of the Act.  
“Unmarried fathers are, despite section 21, still forced to go to court to get a court order 
stating that they automatically acquired rights. This is because they need something 
physical to show that they have rights.”179 The fact that all the requirements of section 
21(1) (b) must be complied with contributes to the frustration of many unmarried fathers. 
Proving compliance is the most difficult part of the procedure.180 This is necessary in 
instances where there is no dispute,181  and also in a situation where the mother of the 
child does not want the father to obtain parental rights and responsibilities. The extent to 
which an unwilling mother might go to prevent the unmarried father from obtaining 
parental rights and responsibilities is illustrated in the case of MM v AV.182  
                                                          
178 229994/2010(WCHC) (unreported judgment), See also Davel CJ and Skelton A “Commentary on   
     the Children’s Act” (Revision Service 6, 2013) 3-12  
179 SALRC (2015) 94 
180 SALRC (2015) 94 
181 SALRC (2015) 94 
182 MM v AV (2011) ZAWCHC 425 
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In MM v AV, the child was conceived while both parties were intoxicated. During the 
pregnancy, they did not have much contact as the alleged father disputed the paternity 
of the child. After the child’s birth and after paternity was confirmed, the now confirmed 
father started playing an active role in the child’s life. The parties co-parented without 
any issues or disputes. The position stayed the same for nine years until the mother of 
the child entered into a marriage with another man. The result was that the mother and 
her husband then unilaterally made changes to the arrangements that the parties had in 
place. The mother went as far as alleging that the child was conceived as a result of 
rape and therefore the unmarried father did not have parental rights and responsibilities. 
She argued that he did not fall within the definition of a “parent” as provided in section 
21(4) of the Act. The father approached the court for interim relief which included 
amongst others, his care and contact with the child as well as an order preventing the 
mother from removing the child from the Republic of South Africa. The interim order was 
granted in February 2010. In November 2010, the points in limine were that the mother 
was entitled to rely on the exclusionary provision in regard to the definition of “parent” in 
section 1 of the Act and if the father is found to be a “parent” in terms of the Act, 
whether she could be compelled to enter into a parenting plan with the father. The court 
found that the mother could not rely on the exclusionary rule and also that she could be 
compelled by the court to enter into an agreement. The court further held that the father 
had always played an active role in the child’s life and that the parties had been co-
parenting successfully for a long time. The court said the following: “M is a child who, 
unlike others in our society, has two parents who are equally devoted to him. To deprive 
M of his father’s continued involvement in his life because of the respondent’s recently 
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acquired dislike for him would result in a miscarriage of justice.”183 The court considered 
the oral evidence and held that granting the father contact and care, as the situation 
was in the past, would be in the child’s best interests.  
3.1.3  COMPULSORY MEDIATION 
In the event that an unmarried father fails to prove that he complies with all the 
requirements as set out in section 21(b) of the Act, a dispute surfaces.  The dispute with 
regard to whether the unmarried father has indeed acquired parental rights and 
responsibilities must now first be mediated as provided for in Section 21(3).184 The 
unmarried father cannot approach the court for assistance unless an attempt has been 
made to resolve the issue by means of mediation. The Act fails to provide for a tool to 
inform the court of the attitudes of the parties in respect of mediation.185 The result is 
that the parties to the dispute can enter the mediation in order to comply with the 
statutory requirement and not because they really want to.186 The Office of the Family 
Advocate is inundated with work which prevents them from doing mediation on an 
urgent basis. The Act however specifically provides for a family advocate as one of the 
persons to conduct mediation should a dispute arise. Mediation conducted by Office of 
the Family Advocate somehow differs from the conventional mediation. The mediation 
process in the conventional sense is subject to specific requirements, which is not the 
case with the Office of the Family Advocate. These requirements are: voluntariness, 
                                                          
183 MM v AV (2011) ZAWCHC  97 
184 Section 21(3) of Act 38 of 2005 reads as follows:  
3(a) If there is a dispute between the biological father referred to in subsection (1) and the biological     
     mother of a child with regard to the fulfilment by that father of the conditions set out in subsection (1)    
(a) or (b), the matter must be referred for mediation to a family advocate, social worker, social    
services   professional or other suitably qualified person. 
185 SALRC (2015) 250 
186 SALRC (2015) 250 
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confidentiality, without prejudice, non-binding outcome and a neutral third party that 
conduct the mediation.187 These requirements are definitely not applicable to the Office 
of the Family Advocate, as the Family Advocate plays an active role in determining the 
final result. Confidentiality is also somehow flawed in that the Family Advocate may be 
called to give evidence against the parties to the dispute or even to cross-examine one 
of the parties. The report of the Family Advocate’s report in most instances becomes 
binding, as the courts are often guided by it. The role of the Office of the Family 
Advocate is more of an investigatory nature than a mediation nature.   
An alternative to the Office of the Family Advocate would be to appointment a private 
mediator or family law facilitator. This is a costly process and often only available to 
parties who have the financial means to appoint a private expert. In the majority of the 
cases the parties involved in these disputes do not have the financial means. Disputes 
arise as to who will be responsible for payment of the mediation fees; further, either 
party might have a preference to appoint a specific mediator. The same problems exist 
with the appointment of a private social worker. The costs involved is often exorbitant 
and not an option for many. This results in a further delay for the unmarried father’s 
acquisition of his rights.  
The SALRC’s proposal is that professional mediators be asked to do some pro bono 
hours as part of their accreditation process and to assist with staff shortages at the 
                                                          
187 Patelia E & Chicktay M “Appropriate Dispute Resolution: A Practical Guide to Negotiation, Mediation   
     and Arbitratio” 2nd ed (2015) Lexis Nexis, Johannesburg 27 
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Office of the Family Advocate.188 Further to this they are also of the opinion that trained 
mediators should be appointed to do mediations.189  
 
An additional proposal by the SALRC is that the Office of the Family Advocate be split 
into two divisions. The one division should deal exclusively with mediations and the 
other with investigations and litigation.  This will ensure objectivity in the sense that if 
mediation is not successful, the matter can then be referred to the other division for the 
investigation and litigation. In this manner the staff of the Office of the Family Advocate 
can focus on a particular function and allocate the necessary time and resources.190 
In the event that mediation was done and an agreement reached between the parties, 
Section 21(3) (b) provides for the result to be reviewed by a court. The review process 
might slow down the process and some of the informants to this study are of the opinion 
that review proceedings should be limited to judicial decisions only. The provision 
places an extra burden on the courts to now spend time on a matter that has already 
gone through the whole mediation process. These resources can be utilised for other 
matters. 
As a consequence, the unmarried father’s access to his is child frustrated again. Family 
Law practitioners allege that in many instances, the mother of the child exploits these 
delays to prevent any access to the child or to restrict contact with the child. Mediation 
itself has its own challenges which include the following: availability of the mediator, 
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who to appoint as the mediator, financial constraints of the parties involved and disputes 
as to who would be responsible for the costs of mediation. It must be kept in mind that 
the purpose of mediation is not to determine how the unmarried father is going to 
exercise his parental rights and responsibilities, but whether he can acquire such rights.  
3.1.4  MIXED JURISDICTION OF THE CHILDREN’S COURT 
The Children’s Act further provides for rules in terms of Civil law as well as Criminal 
Law. The Children’s Court has a comparable status to that of the Magistrate’s Court at 
district level and derives its jurisdiction from section 45(1) of the Act.191 The Children’s 
Court’s jurisdiction is limited to matters relating to children as well as criminal matters in 
certain instances. Section 35 (2) (a) and (b) of the Act reads as follows: 
“(2) (a) A person having care or custody of a child whereby another person has 
access to that child or hold parental rights and responsibilities in respect of that 
child in terms of a parental rights and responsibilities agreement as contemplated 
in section (1) must upon any change in his or her residential address forthwith in 
writing notify such other person of such change. 
(b) A person who fails to comply with paragraph (a) is guilty of an offence and 
liable on conviction to a fine or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding one 
year.” 
This section contains a criminal law component. In the event that one of the parents are 
guilty of such offence as provided for in section 35 (2), the presiding officer of the 
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Children’s Court cannot adjudicate on the matter accurately. The presiding officer’s 
involvement in the civil matter might influence his or her objectivity in making a decision 
in the criminal matter.  According to the informants, in most instances, the mother of the 
child does not notify the unmarried father of anything relating to the child. This includes 
amongst others, information regarding the child’s health, education or residence. The 
unmarried father may then approach the Children’s Court for assistance in respect of 
the mother’s non-compliance with section 35(2) (b). This enquiry converts the 
proceedings into a criminal matter. Essentially this requires the services of a prosecutor 
and other court officials involved in criminal proceedings.  Due to the fact that the 
Children’s Court is not equipped to hear criminal matters, the matter is referred to the 
Criminal Court. This process naturally causes another delay in the proceedings as the 
matter before the Children’s Court can then only continue upon finalisation of the 
Criminal case.  
The provision contained in section 35 of the Act should be read together with section 45 
(2) of the Act for clarity. Section 45 (2) reads as follows: 
 “(2) A children’s court- 
(a) may try or convict a person for non-compliance with an order of a 
children’s court or contempt of court; 
(b) may not try or convict a person in respect of a criminal charge other 
than in terms of paragraph (a); and 
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(c) is bound by the law as applicable to magistrate’s courts when 
exercising criminal jurisdiction in terms of paragraph (a).” 
In considering the jurisdiction provided to the Children’s Court, the pragmatism involved 
in mixing civil law and criminal law must be considered. The reality is that the Children’s 
Court is not equipped to deal with criminal matters, even though they have the powers 
to do so. Their standard operational mode is that of a civil court.  Zaal confirmed this 
and responded to section 45(2) as follows: “…[c]hildren’s courts must utilise the law 
‘applicable to magistrates’ courts when exercising criminal jurisdiction. A children’s court 
usual jurisdictional status of civil courts would, for this purpose, be converted to that of a 
criminal court. This would evidently require the court to move from a balance of 
probabilities evidential onus to the beyond reasonable doubt standard when conducting 
a s45 (2) hearing.”192  This switch from civil court jurisdiction to criminal court jurisdiction 
emphasises the author’s view that the objectivity of the presiding officer might be 
altered. 
 The following discussion will focus on the challenges that exist in the pre-acquisition 
stage of parental rights and responsibilities. In order for an unmarried father to acquire 
parental rights and responsibilities, he needs to comply or fulfil the requirements of 
Section 21(1) (b) of the Act. The burden rests completely on the unmarried father to 
prove compliance.193  
 
                                                          
192 Zaal, F Noel ‘Paper Tigers no More: The New Penalties Jurisdiction For Children’s Courts’  (2010) 127   
    SALJ  407 
193 This paragraph should be read together with page 36 of chapter two for ease of reference. 
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3.1.5  PROOF OF CONSENT TO BEING IDENTIFIED AS THE FATHER  
In respect of Section 21(1)(b)(i) in order for the unmarried father to acquire parental 
rights and responsibilities he needs to prove that he consented to being identified as the 
as the father of the child or that he has paid damages in terms of customary law. The 
section does not provide a prescribed manner in which the consent must be given or 
obtained. Further, it fails to stipulate exactly what kind of customary damages are 
acceptable. In practice, this is very difficult to prove. The majority of the informants are 
of the opinion that even if the father consented to being identified as the father of the 
child, the mother   who is aware of the provisions of the section could do everything 
possible to dispute that the father consented or that he has paid damages. In an attempt 
to prove compliance, the unmarried father might have to go through great lengths and 
incur huge financial implications. One informant is of the strong view that the existence 
of maternal preference by experts involved in many of these disputes contributes to the 
difficult task of the unmarried father to establish his claim. 
3.2.  PROVISIONS OF SECTION 22 
Section 22 of the Act provides for parental rights and agreements194 to be acquired by 
the unmarried father by way of a parental rights and responsibility agreement. The 
agreement is entered into between the mother who has parental rights and 
responsibilities and the unmarried father. The agreement must be drafted in a specific 
manner, something that the parties as lay persons cannot do themselves. These 
                                                          
194 A parental rights and responsibilities agreement is an agreement whereby the mother of the child   
     enters into an agreement with the unmarried father to enable him to acquire parental rights and   
     responsibilities in respect of his child. 
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agreements must be registered by the Office of the Family Advocate or made an order 
of court. The fact that the Office of the Family Advocate is inundated with work and the 
lengthy court rolls makes it almost impossible for these agreements to be registered on 
an urgent basis, which sets back the unmarried father once again. 
In considering the challenges as discussed above, it can be assumed that the 
acquisition of parental rights and responsibilities is not free from problems. Many 
unmarried fathers and their children suffer as a result of all the bridges that the 
unmarried fathers must cross to acquire their parental rights and responsibilities as the 
legislator intended them to have.  The challenges that exist after parental rights and 
responsibilities have been acquired will now be discussed. 
3.3 POST-ACQUISITION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
As soon as the unmarried father’s parental rights and responsibilities are confirmed, as 
was discussed under heading 3.2 above, he finds himself in the same position as any 
other holder of parental rights and responsibilities.  However, it is not the end of the 
battle for him. Even though he now has parental rights and responsibilities, he may 
continue to encounter problems in relation to exercising his rights. The most recurring 
problems identified by informants will now be discussed. 
3.3.1  PARENTAL ALIENATION 
“Parental alienation (PA) refers to the wide variety of symptoms that may result from or 
be associated with a child’s alienation from a parent. Children may become alienated 
from a parent because of physical abuse, with or without sexual abuse. Children’s 
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alienation may be the result of parental emotional abuse, which may overt in the form of 
verbal abuse or more covert in the form of neglect…Children may become alienated as 
the result of parental abandonment.”195 
Gardner196 defines Parental Alienation Syndrome as “… a childhood disorder that arises 
almost exclusively in the context of child-custody disputes. Its primary manifestation is 
the child’s campaign that has no justification. It results from the combination of a 
programming (brainwashing) parent’s indoctrinations and the child’s own contributions 
to the vilification of the target parent.” Parental alienation syndrome is a common 
challenge for unmarried fathers. As defined above, a mother who is aware of the 
unmarried father’s parental rights and responsibilities, but refuses to accept the status 
quo, will do almost anything to prevent the unmarried father from exercising his rights. 
An informant indicated that in her experience this is often a result of the non-payment or 
short payment of maintenance on the unmarried father’s part. The majority of mothers 
involved in these disputes confidently believe that an unmarried father’s failure to pay 
maintenance for his child validates that his contact should be restricted.  
Another factor that contributes to parental alienation syndrome is the fact that many 
mothers want to be in control when the actual visitation takes place, or they want the 
visitation to take place under supervision. This is not always possible. Supervision as a 
factor will be discussed later in this chapter. Many mothers brainwash the child to the 
extent that the child believes that the father is bad and that it is not in his or her best 
interests to have contact with him.  
                                                          
195 Gardner, R ‘Parental Alienation Syndrome vs Parental Alienation: Which Diagnosis Should Evaluators   
     Use in Child-Custody Disputes?’ (2002) The American Journal Of Family Therapy 94 
196 Gardner,R (2002) 95 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
The courts consider the child’s best interests to be of paramount importance. Therefore, 
in the event that parental alienation occurs, the unmarried father will rely on expert 
evidence to prove that contact with the child will indeed be in the best interests of the 
child. The unmarried father thus has no choice but to appoint a psychologist or 
someone suitable to do an assessment on his contact with the child. The appointment 
of these experts does not come at a low cost hence the option is then only available to 
unmarried fathers who are financially able.  
3.3.2  SUPERVISION 
Another existing problem is supervision of contact between the unmarried father and his 
child. In many instances the mother falsely alleges that the unmarried father might harm 
the child if access is not supervised. This often stems from false allegations of sexual 
molestation, neglect and drug or alcohol abuse by the father. All the institutions linked to 
this process, such as the Office of the Family Advocate and the courts; consider such 
allegations as very serious. This often results in the proceeding being suspended 
pending the outcome of the investigation by the Office of the Family Advocate, social 
workers or the Criminal Court if  a criminal charge was made.  Subsequent to this 
investigation, the court may make an order granting the unmarried father access to the 
child but on condition that such access is supervised. The appointment of the supervisor 
poses more problems and delays in terms of the enforcement of the father’s parental 
rights and responsibilities. 
The Office of the Family Advocate is the only institution where the services are not 
charged for, but they are also the only body that do not offer supervision by their 
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experts. The alternative route for the unmarried father is then, at his own cost, to 
appoint a private social worker to supervise his contact with the child. The costs 
involved will differ from one case to another and may become exorbitant especially if 
supervision is to be done after hours or over weekends. As in the case of the 
appointment of a psychologist, this route is only an option if the unmarried father is 
financially able.  
3.3.3  ENFORCING PARENTAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AGREEMENTS 
The existence of a parental rights and responsibilities agreement as provided for in 
section 22 of the Act often creates the  impression that all disputes between the parties 
are now resolved. These parental rights and responsibilities agreements are often 
confused with parental plans197 as provided for in section 33 of the Act. This should be 
distinguished from parental rights and responsibilities agreements in that section 33 
becomes operative where the father is already a co-holder of parental rights and 
responsibilities.  
The informants have divided opinions on the effectiveness of parental rights and 
responsibility agreements. This relates to the role that the courts and the Office of the 
Family Advocate have in respect of registering the agreements as well as the drafting of 
the agreements. As section 22(3) regulates the format of these agreements, the parties 
as lay persons are not in a position to draft agreements themselves and are thus 
dependant on the assistance of people in the legal profession. 
                                                          
197 A parental plan is used in divorce or separation proceedings where the parties determine the contact   
     and care of the child or children. 
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One informant is of the opinion that in some cases the parental rights and 
responsibilities agreement takes the form of a standard consent paper, which is often 
vague and the content thereof difficult to give effect to. These agreements often contain 
provisions that provide for the best interests of the child but are not practical in relation 
to the circumstances and needs of the child and the unmarried father. This often results 
in the need for facilitation. Facilitation is also known as private case management,198 or 
as Professor De Jong refers to it as “Parenting coordination…is a child focused 
alternative dispute resolution process in which a mental health or legal professional with 
mediation training and experience assists the high-conflict parties in implementing 
parenting plans and resolving pre- and post-divorce parenting disputes in an immediate, 
non-adversarial, court sanctioned, private forum.” 199 In the Western Cape it is referred 
to as facilitation and in Gauteng it is referred to as case management.200 Facilitation 
becomes a part of the proceedings when a dispute arises in respect of the parental 
rights and responsibilities agreement signed by the parties. It is ordered by the court 
with or without the consent of the parties.201  A facilitator is a neutral third party who has 
decision-making authority, and who intervenes to help the parties reach a common 
decision or goal. The impartial facilitator guides the process, manages conflict, identifies 
and solves problems, and makes decisions.”202  In the event that the parties cannot 
agree on who to appoint as the facilitator, the court may appoint a facilitator and also 
make an order as to how the costs of the facilitator will be paid.203 The costs involved in 
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199 De Jong, M ‘Is parenting coordination arbitration?’ July 2013:38 De Rebus 127 
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the facilitation process also contribute to the frustration of unmarried fathers and often 
makes it impossible for an agreement to even exist.  As soon as an agreement has 
been reached by the parties involved, the Office of the Family Advocate must confirm 
that the agreement is in the child’s best interests. Only upon confirmation of this can the 
parental rights and responsibilities agreement be registered by the Office of the Family 
Advocate or made an order of court. After registration of these parental rights and 
responsibilities agreements, the enforcement thereof is influenced by the approach of 
the parties.  
The difficulty arises where the parties cannot reach an agreement and the facilitator or 
the court consequently makes an order that is in the child’s best interests. This was 
illustrated in the case of MM v AV 204 where the mother did not want to enter into a 
parental rights and responsibilities agreement with the father of the child. She also 
refused to have the matter mediated and this refusal brought the father to approach the 
court for relief.  
The court said the following:  
“Section 21 of the Children’s Act similarly makes provision for parents of children born 
out of wedlock to agree upon a parenting plan. Where the parties are not able to agree 
either directly or through mediation then either party has the right to approach court in 
order to determine how their parental rights and responsibilities are to be exercised. 
Accordingly, the provisions of s21 of the Children’s Act are nothing new: they simply 
serve to codify the legal position which previously pertained. What is important to note is 
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that this is entirely consistent with the ‘best interests of the child’ principle enshrined in 
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Section 28 of the Constitution stipulates 
that in all matters concerning a child it is the child’s best interests which are paramount 
and that every child has the right to parental care. In my view those provisions 
recognise and moreover dictate that a court as upper guardian of all minor children 
must place the best interests of the child and the rights of the child above those of his 
parents.”205 
The court, as the upper guardian of all minors, ordered that the parties shall exercise 
their parental rights and responsibilities in accordance with the parental plan ordered by 
the court.   
This type of order is often unsatisfactory to either or both parents. Even if it is the 
desired outcome, it is often frustrated by one party’s non-compliance with the court 
order or the agreement made between the parties.206 The failure by either party to 
comply with the provisions of the parental rights and responsibilities agreement which is 
made an order of court may result in a charge of contempt of court. In practice, the 
guilty party is often the mother, who even after signing the parental rights and 
responsibilities agreement, still feels that the unmarried father is not worthy of his 
parental rights and responsibilities. None of informants could confirm that they had 
experienced instances where a mother was arrested because of a charge of contempt 
of court. The opinion is that this option is not often pursued due to the fear of 
traumatising the child when the mother is arrested and also the fear that this could 
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contribute to the parental alienation that is already in existence. Presiding officers are 
also not likely to convict a parent on a charge of contempt of court.207 As a result of this 
many unmarried fathers elect to summarily abandon the battle and wait until the child is 
of an age to render his or her opinion. The unmarried father often finds himself stuck in 
this vicious circle and remains at the mercy of the mother.208 The research indicates 
that an unmarried father needs to get past a number of stumbling blocks to reach the 
point of exercising his parental rights and responsibilities.  The challenges related to 
access to justice will now be discussed. 
3.4 ACCESS TO JUSTICE 
Access to justice by the parties to a dispute in relation to parental rights and 
responsibilities is one of the greatest challenges. The problems occur either as a result 
of the procedures in place or it is attributed to the parties’ financial positions. The 
different aspects of access to justice will now be discussed.   
3.4.1  LITIGATION IN THE HIGH COURT 
The legal practitioners that were interviewed have experience in both High Court and 
Children’s Court litigation. However, a preference for litigation relating to parental rights 
and agreements in the High Court was observed. They are of the opinion that relief can 
be sought almost instantly by litigating in the High Court. This is possible because the 
High Court Rules, specifically Rule 43,209 provides for the court to make an Interim 
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209 Rule 43 of the Supreme Court Rules reads as follows: 
     (1) This rule shall apply whenever a spouse seeks relief from the court in  
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Order in respect of access and custody.  In view of the urgent nature of an application 
for the acquisition of parental rights and responsibilities, the High Court Rules also 
provide for matters to be heard on an urgent basis.210 Even though the court may still 
order that investigations should be done by various experts and that the matter will not 
be finalised immediately, the unmarried father can get some form of relief in the form of 
an interim order.  
The down side of litigation in the High Court is that although speedy in respect of 
seeking interim relief, it is expensive and not all unmarried fathers can afford it. Some 
practitioners indicated that they have attended to parental rights and responsibilities 
applications on a pro bono basis, but this is not a regular occurrence. The reality is that 
such an application can cost approximately R50 000,00. This is not the kind of money 
that everyone has at their disposal. Some unmarried fathers often depend on the 
assistance of Legal Aid because they cannot afford to pay the costs for a private 
attorney and not to mention advocate’s fees. Thus, the costs involved in litigation in the 
High Court is the one thing that prevents most unmarried fathers from benefitting from 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
     respect of one or more of the following matters:  
     (a) Maintenance pendente lite;  
     (b) a contribution towards the costs of a pending matrimonial action;  
     (c) interim custody of any child;  
     (d) interim access to any child.  
210 Rule 12 (a) In urgent applications the court or a judge may dispense with the forms and service     
    provided for in these Rules and may dispose of such matter at such time and place and in such    
    manner  and in accordance with such procedure (which shall as far as practicable be in terms of these   
    Rules) as to it seems meet.  
    (b)In every affidavit or petition filed in support of any application under paragraph (a) of this subrule, the   
    applicant shall set forth explicitly the circumstances which he avers render the matter urgent and the  
    reasons why he claims that he could not be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course.  
    (c) A person against whom an order was granted in his absence in an urgent application may by notice  
    set down the matter for reconsideration of the order.  
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the interim  relief which can be sought from the High Court. The consequence is that 
they have no option but to approach the Children’s Court at no cost to them. 
3.4.2  LITIGATION IN THE CHILDREN’S COURT 
The majority of unmarried fathers approach the Children’s Court for assistance due to 
the fact that it does not cost them anything.  The existing challenges related to litigation 
in the Children’s Court are amongst others the delay in finalisation of matters and the 
limited jurisdiction that the Children’s Court has.  
As lay persons, many unmarried fathers are not familiar with the terminology used and 
the legal processes contained in the Children’s Act. In practice, the informants alleged 
that this often results in them being referred to the High Court. An example of this is 
when an unmarried father approaches the clerk of the Children’s Court to apply for 
parental rights and responsibilities. His enquiry is often misinterpreted in that he might 
enquire about an application for custody or guardianship, but actually only want to apply 
for contact. The Children’s Court’s jurisdiction is limited to “matters involving the well-
being of a child including the care of, or contact with a child”211 and may not adjudicate 
in applications for custody or guardianship. This falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the High Court212 as the upper guardian of all minors. The unmarried father is 
instantaneously sent away. The Clerk of the Court as the first port of call often does not 
have the time to make further enquiries as to the actual relief sought by the unmarried 
father. The result is that the unmarried father is sent from pillar to post and a few weeks 
or even months later still has not achieved anything. An informant indicated that he 
                                                          
211 SALRC (2015) 255 
212 Section 45(3) of Act 38 of 2005 
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assesses all applications personally before referring the person to the High Court. In 
order to obtain clarity in respect of the application, he would request that the unmarried 
father file an affidavit to stipulate the relief sought by him and in addition to that he 
allows the unmarried father to come to court and explain what it is that he wants. This, 
however, does not happen at all Children’s Courts. “The lack of experience of the 
rotating magistrates results in procedural difficulty and irregularity in the application of 
the Act and causes undue delays.”213 
The Children’s Court rolls are encumbered. Matters are frequently postponed for the 
following reasons: to afford the party against whom the application is made an 
opportunity to come to court or obtain legal representation, final reports of the Office of 
the Family Advocate are not completed timeously when the court orders an enquiry or 
investigation, and reports from social workers or psychologists as well reports from 
mediators and facilitators are also delayed for lengthy periods. Many of these experts 
are often inundated with work and therefore are not in a position to finalise their reports 
or recommendations on an urgent basis. On the other hand, if private experts are 
appointed, the much needed reports and recommendations will almost be available 
immediately, but as mentioned before, this is only an option for the financially able 
unmarried father.  Thus, frequently matters cannot be finalised speedily. The Children’s 
Act also does not provide for urgent applications like the High Court Rules. 
 
 
                                                          
213 SALRC (2015) 263 
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3.4.3  OFFICE OF THE FAMILY ADVOCATE 
The office of the Family Advocate is the one institution which offers mediation to parties 
at no cost. However, their experts do not become involved in the absence of an 
application for parental rights and responsibilities before either the High Court or the 
Children’s Court. The Office of the Family Advocate, as is the case with the Children’s 
Court, services hundreds of clients and is responsible for all disputes related to children. 
Their Offices do not have the time to investigate each settlement agreement sent to 
them.214 As a result of this, appointments for mediation are scheduled a few months 
after the initial application is made. The investigations and reports often also do take a 
long time to be finalised. Due to a lack of resources, their Offices can only investigate 
matters that are before the court, even though their scope of duties includes assisting 
with the protection of the best interests of the child involved in a contact and care 
dispute.215 The Act however specifically provides for a family advocate as one of the 
persons to conduct mediation should a dispute arise. Mediation conducted by Office of 
the Family Advocate somehow differs from the conventional mediation. The mediation 
process in the conventional sense is subject to specific requirements, which is not the 
case with the Office of the Family Advocate. These requirements are: voluntariness, 
confidentiality, without prejudice, non-binding outcome and a neutral third party that 
conduct the mediation.216 These requirements are definitely not applicable to the Office 
of the Family Advocate, as the Family Advocate plays an active role in determining the 
final result. Confidentiality is also somehow flawed in that the Family Advocate may be 
                                                          
214 SALRC (2015) 278 
215 SALRC (2015) 278 
216 Patelia E & Chicktay M “Appropriate Dispute Resolution: A Practical Guide to Negotiation, Mediation   
     and Arbitration” 2nd ed (2015) Lexis Nexis, Johannesburg 27 
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called to give evidence against the parties to the dispute or even to cross-examine one 
of the parties. The report of the Family Advocate’s report in most instances becomes 
binding, as the courts are often guided by it. The role of the Office of the Family 
Advocate is more of an investigatory nature than a mediation nature.  Once again, by no 
fault of the unmarried father, the process is delayed. If he had the financial ability, he 
could take the alternative route of appointing or approaching private experts. 
3.4.4  SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICES 
An unmarried father will in most cases only approach the South African Police Services 
(hereinafter referred to as SAPS) as a last resort. In the circumstance that the 
unmarried father entered into a parental rights and responsibility agreement, and such 
agreement is now registered and made an order of the court, the mother sometimes 
then decides that she does not want to comply with the order and restricts or refuses 
the father’s contact to the child completely. The unmarried father then approaches 
SAPS for assistance in either enforcing the parental rights and responsibilities 
agreement or to lay a charge of contempt of court. The officers of SAPS, due to 
inexperience and lack of education, immediately refer the unmarried father to other 
legislation such as the Domestic Violence Act,217 and more specifically they are often 
referred to the Domestic Violence Court. According to the informants in this study, in 
some instances SAPS refuse to assist the unmarried father with laying a charge of 
contempt of court and simply advise that they do not get involved in family related 
issues. In the event that the complaint of contempt of court is lodged with SAPS, the 
                                                          
217 Act 116 of 1998 
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prospects of a proper investigation are slim.218 Again the unmarried father walks right 
into a brick wall and the whole process is almost repeated as he must now go back to 
the Children’s Court or the High Court to apply for variation of the court order or for a 
contempt of court order.  
4.  CONCLUSION 
The main challenges faced by unmarried fathers can briefly be summarised as 
misinterpretation or confusion of the Act, the costs involved in litigation in the High Court 
and the financial implications of appointing private experts in attempt to expedite the 
process. In addition to this, the workloads of the staff and presiding officers of the 
Children’s Court, the Offices of the Family Advocate play a significant role. Lastly, the 
inexperience and reluctance of SAPS members to assist in disputes relating to parental 
rights and responsibilities contributes to the unmarried father’s challenges. As was 
mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the law has been reformed to afford 
unmarried fathers parental rights and responsibilities. By assessing these challenges, 
the question as to whether these rights are enforceable can be answered in the 
negative. Beyl219 is of the opinion that the position of unmarried fathers has only 
changed prima facie. The responses to the questionnaires in this research confirmed 
the existence of serious challenges to enforcement on the ground. Therefore it can be 
concluded that the position of unmarried fathers has not necessarily changed for the 
better, not if the enforcement of their rights are practically impossible. The following 
                                                          
218 SALRC (2015) 249 
219 Beyl A, Critical  Analysis of Section 21 of the Children’s  Act 38 of 2005 with specific reference to the    
     Parental Responsibilities and Rights of unmarried fathers (LLM 2013 University Pretoria)ii 
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chapter will be giving recommendations on how to ensure that the enforcement of 
parental rights and responsibilities of unmarried fathers become more accessible and 
practical. 
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CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this research was to firstly to determine how enforceable the rights of 
unmarried fathers as contained in section 21 of the Act are, and, secondly, how the 
enforceability can be made more effective and practical. Having explored some of the 
challenges in the previous chapters, this chapter now provides some recommendations. 
The objective of chapter one was to determine the research question and to set out the 
framework for the chapters contained within this dissertation. It was proposed that 
attempts have been made by the legislator to change the position of unmarried fathers, 
but the question of practical difficulties and enforceability remained unanswered.  
The aim of chapter two was to outline the development of the rights of unmarried fathers 
from the ancient times where the common law was applicable until today where we 
have the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 that regulates the parent-child relationship. It was 
concluded that irrespective of the attempts made by the legislator to provide for an 
improved position for unmarried fathers, their position remains to some extent 
unchanged. Section 21 unfairly discriminates against some unmarried fathers on the 
basis of their marital status. Furthermore the procedures providing for the acquisition of 
parental rights and responsibilities are not fair and just. 
The aim of chapter three was to conduct research to determine the practical challenges 
faced by unmarried fathers attempting to give effect to their rights as contained in 
section 21 of the Act. The following challenges proved to be most problematic: 
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Interpretation of the legislation, jurisdiction of the Children’s Court and most importantly 
access to justice. 
While compiling the information obtained from the research conducted, it became 
evident that indeed there are a number of challenges that prevent or restrict unmarried 
fathers from effectively enforcing their rights as contained in section 21 of the Children’s 
Act. It can now be confirmed that neither the acquisition nor exercising of parental rights 
and responsibilities is problem free. The legislator’s intention when promulgating the Act 
was to afford unmarried fathers the much needed rights that they have been struggling 
to obtain for years. As with all laws, there may be teething problems and the 
enforceability may be tested over the years. Suffice to say, the teething process for the 
Children’s Act has now passed and it is time to admit that that the Act is not flawless.   
The purpose of this concluding chapter is to make proposals and recommendations in 
respect of the legislation as well as to make the enforcement of the rights in section 21 
of the Act more practical. 
2.  RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPECT OF LEGISLATION   
2.1  “PERMANENT LIFE-PARTNERSHIP” 
The uncertainty in respect of what a “permanent life-partnership” is places a burden on 
our courts to determine and interpret the meaning thereof. One manner in which this 
can be remedied is by providing a definition for the term in the Act. This will assist the 
courts with interpretation and will also speed up the proceedings. The following 
proposals could possibly assist with the interpretation of the term. 
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The Oxford definition of “permanent” speaks about “lasting indefinitely”. The Collin’s 
dictionary defines “life- partner” as either party to a long term relationship. “Partnership” 
is defined by the Oxford dictionary as a union. In considering all of these meanings and 
definitions of the term “permanent life-partnership”, it can be assumed that the focus is 
on the intentions of the parties involved.  
A permanent life-partnership is similar to a universal partnership. The similarity lies in 
the requirements to prove the existence of a universal partnership. The courts consider 
the conduct and intentions of the parties to the partnership to determine the existence of 
a universal partnership.220 The partnership does not have to be entered into 
expressly.221 “It can come into existence tacitly or by conduct of the parties.”222 The 
author is of the opinion that the same factors as is required to prove the existence of a 
universal partnership, with the emphasis on the intentions of the parties, should be 
considered when determining the existence of a permanent life-partnership for purposes 
of the Children’s Act.   
 In relation to the intention of the parties, both might not have the same intentions; 
hence the commitment of the unmarried father could be questioned. This issue might 
only surface when the relationship has come to an end. “Thus a father may find his 
claim that he was living with the mother in a permanent life partnership at the time of the 
                                                          
220 The court in Schrepfer v Ponelat [2010] ZAWCHC 193, referred to the two types of universal 
partnerships described by Pothiers as follows: “universom quae ex quaestu  venuint”  means : “ The 
parties thereby contract a partnership of all that they may acquire during its continuance, from every kind 
of commerce. They are considered to enter into this kind of partnership when they declare that they 
contract together a partnership without any further explanation.” and “The partnership universorum 
bonorum is that by which the contracting parties agree to put in common all their property, both present 
and future.”   Para 5 
221 Schrepfer v Ponelat [2010] ZAWCHC para 6 
222 Schrepfer v Ponelat [2010] ZAWCHC para 6 
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child’s birth is refuted by the mother who may say that there was never an intention for 
the relationship to be permanent.”223  Therefore, in providing a definition of the term, the 
inclusion of certain subjective elements may make it easier to interpret. An example of 
this definition would be the following: 
“Permanent life-partnership” for purposes of the Act means: the relationship between 
the biological parents of the child who possess or prove to have the necessary intention 
to be involved in a permanent relationship. The intention component could become 
difficult to prove, but this can be remedied with regulations to the Act. An effective way 
to prove intention on the part of a person is by assessing his or her conduct during the 
existence of the relationship. The proposed regulations to the Act should contain or 
provide a list of factors that should be considered in assessing whether the conduct or 
contribution of the parties to the dispute indicates any form of intention or consent to be 
part of a permanent relationship. These factors should also include the assessment of 
the commitment levels of the parties to each other.224  
2.2  PROOF OF CONSENT TO BEING IDENTIFIED AS THE FATHER 
The Act in section 21(1) (b) (i) provides for the acquisition of parental rights and 
responsibilities if the unmarried father consented to be identified as the father of the 
                                                          
223 Boezaart T “Child Law in South Africa” (2009) 74 
224Butters v Mncoro 2012 ZASCA 29 at para 18 the court referred to the requirements of a universal 
partnership as formulated by Pothier as: “…2. A universal partnership of all property does not require an 
express agreement. Like any other contract it can also come into existence by tacit agreement that is by 
an agreement derived from the conduct of the parties. 
3. The requirements for a universal partnership of all property, including universal partnerships between 
cohabitees, are the same as those formulated by Pothier for partnerships in general. 
4. Where the conduct of the parties is capable of more than one inference, the test for when a tacit 
universal partnership can be held to exist is whether it is more probable than not that a tacit agreement.” 
had been reached.” 
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child. Section 26 of the Act further allows for an unmarried father to apply for an 
amendment in terms of the Births and Deaths Registration Act 51 of 1992 and 
subsection (b) provides for an application to the court in the event that the mother 
refuses to give her consent for such amendment. This creates a challenge for the 
unmarried father. In the event that the unmarried father indeed consented to being 
identified as the father of the child, the mother can dispute such consent. Thus, the 
burden is then on the father to prove that he had indeed consented. The author’s 
proposal in this regard is that the burden of proof be shifted to the mother of the child. 
The onus should be on her to prove that the unmarried father did not consent, or has no 
interest in being identified as the father of the child. This could be done by way of a 
regulation stipulating the manner in which she should prove non-consent. In addition to 
this, a statement or affidavit deposed to by the mother confirming that the unmarried 
father did not give consent should be produced upon registration of the child’s birth.  
2.3  “CONTRIBUTION FOR A REASONABLE PERIOD” 
The interpretation of “contribution for a reasonable period” contributes to many disputes. 
Once again, the Act does not provide a definition. As discussed in chapter three, 
“contribution for a reasonable period” will depend on the circumstances of the child. 
What is reasonable for one child will differ from another child. The phrase is often 
differently interpreted by the parties to the disputes. In order for an unmarried father to 
prove that he contributed for a reasonable period, he will require physical proof. Once 
again, to add to the enforceability of the section, the term must be clearly defined or 
regulated by the Act. Gabriel AJ referred to the term as an elastic concept and that it 
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allows for a range of considerations of circumstances to make a value judgment.225 The 
court in Steadman and Landman,226 as discussed in chapter 3, leaned towards the 
parties’ interpretation of a “contribution for a reasonable period”. The Supreme Court of 
Appeal in KLVC v SDI stated: “… what constitutes a reasonable period in the 
circumstances must be determined with reference to inter alia the age of the child and 
the circumstances of the parties at the time the determination is made.”227 The court 
considered the contributions that the appellant made towards the child’s expenses up to 
the time that the child was removed from South Africa and held that it could not be 
described as insubstantial in relation to the maintenance of the child over a period of 
four months.228  
The SALRC in their latest issue paper is of the opinion that because of the uncertainty 
with regard to the meaning of the “permanent life-partnership” and the requirements of 
section 21(b), the words contained in the section that may lead to unnecessary factual 
disputes should be removed.229 The author does not agree with this proposal of the 
SALRC. The reason for the disagreement is that removing the aforementioned terms 
will lead to even more uncertainty and interpretation problems. The inclusion of these 
terms in the section offers some kind of guideline with regard to applying the section.  
                                                          
225 I v C [2014] ZAKZDHC para 35 
226 229994/2010(WCHC) (unreported judgment) 
227 KLVC v SDI [2015] 1 ALL SA 532 (SCA)  para 21 
228 KLVC v SDI [2015] 1 ALL SA 532 (SCA)  para 32; In determining the contribution of the appellant, the 
court stated : “ It is not in dispute that the first respondent purchased certain items for S including a 
heater, a pram, a car seat, clothing as well as nappies and other necessities. He also built a changing 
table for S with his own hands as he wanted him to have something special and personal from his 
father…”  
229 SALRC Issue Paper Family Disputes Resolution : Care of and  Contact with Children, 2015 (Project 
100D) 94 
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Another proposal put forward by the SALRC in respect hereof was that the section 
should provide space for the promulgation of regulations to guide and provide what 
factors or considerations should be taken into account when determining whether the 
requirements of section 21(b) have been complied with.230 
In light of the fact that proving a “contribution for a reasonable period” is based on the 
age of the child, the interpretation of the term by the parties, as well the circumstances 
of the parties, the best way in which to determine what the term really means is by way 
of regulations to the Act. The regulations should contain a list or a set of factors to assist 
the court with interpreting what conduct and contribution by the unmarried father would 
fall under the definition of a “contribution for a reasonable period”. These factors should 
include consideration of the circumstances of the child as well as the parents. 
The author’s proposal is that the term “contribution for a reasonable period” remains as 
is, but becomes guided by regulations to the Act, as proposed by the SALRC. 
 2.4     SECTION 21(3)   
The term “mediation” appears in section 21(3) (a) of the Act with no clear definition of it 
contained anywhere else in the Act. “The processes described in the Act, furthermore, 
do not accord with the usual (if somewhat muddled) understanding of what mediation 
entails. It has, therefore been argued that Family advocates and Family Councellors are 
not authorised to conduct mediations per se in terms of the Act, but rather to conduct 
enquiries and investigations.”231  The author’s proposal in this regard and especially in 
relation to amendments of section 23(b) is to remove the word “family advocate” and 
                                                          
230 SALRC (2015) 94 
231 SALRC (2015) 272 
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replace it with the word “registered mediator”. This will allow the Office of the Family 
Advocate to continue doing investigations into the best interests of the child with their 
available time and resources. Section 21(3) (b) provides for a review process in the 
event that the parties are not happy with the outcome of the mediation. Review 
proceedings are applicable to judicial proceedings exclusively. Mediation on the other 
hand is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. The section places the burden on 
the courts to now consider an issue that has already be decided on. The proposal in this 
regard is that section 21(3) (b) is removed from the section as mediation is not a judicial 
procedure. Further, if professional mediators are appointed, the mediators and the 
disputing parties will be bound by all the characteristics of mediation, hence if an 
agreement is reached and signed after the mediation process, such agreement 
becomes binding and can be made an order of court.  
3. RECOMMENDATIONS IN RESPECT OF PRACTICE AND PROCESS 
3.1 SECTION 22 
Section 22 provides for the acquisition of parental rights and responsibilities by an 
unmarried father by way of a parental rights and responsibilities agreement. The Act 
clearly stipulates that these agreements are only effective if they have been registered 
by the Office of the Family Advocate or if they are made an order of court. The author is 
of the view that these agreements would be more effective if they are made a court 
order from the onset. In other words, the Office of the Family Advocate should still play 
a role in the proceedings, but not as a decision making body. The proposal is that all 
parental rights and responsibilities agreements should be made an order of court. 
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Hence, section 22(4) (a) of the Act should be removed. The Office of the Family 
Advocate should conduct an investigation into the best interests of the child, and upon 
their recommendation, the agreement should be made a court order. This would make 
the enforceability of these agreements more effective in that non-compliance can 
automatically be dealt with in terms of section 45(2) of the Act.  The Act should also 
provide for a mechanism that monitors the compliance of parental rights and 
responsibilities agreements and also provide a procedure to be followed should non-
compliance occur.    
3.2  SECTION 45 
Section 45(1) of the Act stipulates that the Children’s Court can adjudicate on any 
matter that relates to the well-being of the child. The adjudication of guardianship 
applications is excluded from the scope of the Children’s Court and falls within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court. The author’s proposal is that the jurisdiction of 
the Children’s Court be broadened to include applications for guardianship.  
The provision in section 45(2) of the Act adds a criminal component to the jurisdiction of 
the Children’s Court. As discussed in chapter 3, this creates challenges for the presiding 
officers as well as the unmarried father. One of these challenges is that if a charge of 
contempt is brought before the court; the court must convert to a criminal court. Due to 
the fact that the Children’s Court is not equipped to be a criminal court, the matter is 
referred, causing delays and limiting access to justice on the part of the unmarried 
father. The proposal in this regard is that section 45(2) of the Act is removed in its 
entirety. This section creates confusion and also places an extra burden on the courts. 
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In the event that the section is removed, all contempt of court matters will be dealt with 
by the criminal court as it should be in terms of the jurisdiction of the criminal court.  
3.3 PROVISION FOR INTERIM ORDERS, URGENT APPLICATIONS AND 
SUMMARY ENQUIRIES 
An application for parental rights and responsibilities is often done by an unmarried 
father who has done whatever he could to gain access to his child. Upon considering 
the enforcement of the unmarried father’s section 21 rights and the child’s best interest, 
these applications are often done on an urgent basis. The Act does not contain a 
specific section that allows the court grant Interim Orders. It further does not make 
provision for matters to be heard on an urgent basis as opposed to the jurisdiction of the 
High Court where both urgent applications as well as interim orders can be sought.  The 
author’s proposal is that these two procedures be included in the Act. The consequence 
will be that unmarried fathers, who do not have the financial means to approach the 
High Court for assistance, will be able to go to the Children’s Court. This will contribute 
to the workload of Children’s Court staff and presiding officers, but this can be remedied 
by appointment of more staff and presiding officers. The proposed amendment is to be 
done in section 46 of the Act and should read as follows: “A Children’s Court may hear 
matters on an urgent basis, only if such hearing is in the best interests of the child.” and 
“A Children’s Court may hear make interim orders insofar as it relates to interim contact 
or care of any child.” In respect of procedural uniformity, the same procedures as 
contained in Rule 12 in respect of urgent applications of the High Court Rules can be 
utilised. Another proposal is to implement a summary enquiry system with a panel of 
appropriately qualified experts. The outcome of this enquiry can assist the presiding 
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officer with making a decision. Hence, this will shorten the time spent by the court in 
making the enquiry itself and also reduce conflict and the paperwork that presiding 
officers are faced with when dealing with these matters. 
3.4   PRESIDING OFFICERS AND CHILDREN’S COURT STAFF 
The research conducted indicated that many unmarried fathers are referred to the High 
Court due to the misinterpretation of the legislation. This is a common occurrence. This 
can be remedied by educating the administrative staff of the Children’s Courts. Training 
should be provided to the staff to enable them to make adequate enquiries before 
referring a person to another court. Training should also be given to presiding officers. A 
magistrate often works in different courts and sometimes has limited knowledge in 
respect of family law. The author’s proposal is that the Minister of Justice appoints a 
presiding officer with the necessary expertise and qualifications in children’s matters for 
each Children’s Court. This will ensure that we have competent presiding officers 
hearing the matters and this will contribute to finalising matters in a minimum time 
period.  In having competent presiding officers and court staff, unmarried fathers are 
sure to be assisted in enforcing their rights within shorter time periods.  
The SALRC’s proposal is that the presiding officers appointed for the Children’s Courts 
should fit the following criteria: “a) be a specialist in family law and the Children’s Act; b) 
receive specialist training on the Children’s Act, the Bill of Rights and international 
instruments that deal with children; c) hold the position on a permanent basis; and d) 
not be rotated.”232 
                                                          
232 SALRC (2015) 264 
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3.5 APPOINTMENT OF EXPERTS 
In the past presiding officers were guided by common sense and their right to use their 
discretion in making complex decisions. Today, the Act provides for the input of different 
experts that results in the postponement of matters for long periods and matters not 
reaching a conclusion. The great challenge that does exist is the costs involved in 
appointing private experts to conduct assessments and investigations. The majority of 
the unmarried fathers cannot afford to pay these experts and therefore their rights 
cannot be enforced. The proposal in this regard is that a special body consisting of 
social workers, mediators and facilitators is created in the Act. The Act should contain 
provisions defining their respective duties as well as procedures and timeframes that 
should be followed by the experts in assisting the courts. These experts should be 
dedicated to children’s rights matters exclusively. Their most important function should 
be to make sure that the courts are placed in receipt of whatever reports are required as 
speedily as possible. These reports could relate to an investigation by a social worker, 
court ordered facilitation or reports where the services of a mediator is required. These 
experts should also be available to conduct court ordered supervision. This will take the 
pressure off the Office of the Family Advocate as well and will allow access to every 
unmarried father in need of expert assistance. The aim of this proposal is to ensure that 
all unmarried fathers, irrespective of their standing in society and their financial means, 
have access to these experts to assist with enforcing their rights.  
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4. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS TO SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT 
4.1  EDUCATION OF UNMARRIED FATHERS 
Unmarried fathers should be educated as to what their rights are and how to give effect 
to such rights. The only way in which this can occur is to have workshops within the 
communities. The workshops should cover information regarding their rights and also 
the remedies available to them in the event that they need to apply for parental rights 
and responsibilities. Clarity with regard to the terminology involved in these applications 
is also important. This will prevent unmarried fathers from being sent from pillar to post, 
as they will know what relief they are seeking and they will be in a position to 
communicate their needs to the court officials. The best possible way to reach out to 
these unmarried fathers is to partner with the community advice offices and various 
NGO’s and legal professionals to bring this information to society.  
4.2  EDUCATION OF MOTHERS 
It is important to note that in most instances the mothers, as the other party to these 
disputes, are responsible for the growing numbers of disputes relating to parental rights 
and responsibilities. Mothers should be educated on the provisions of the Act. The most 
important issue that needs to be communicated with them is the fact that the best 
interests of the child is of paramount importance. Their feelings towards the father are 
not considered as a determining factor. Further, they need to understand that non-
payment or short payment of maintenance does not justify their refusal of the unmarried 
father’s contact with his child. The child has a constitutional right to parental care, which 
includes both parents and not just the parent providing for the child on a daily basis. 
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They need to be explained that contribution towards the child’s upbringing does not just 
entail financial means. The fact that the unmarried father wants to play a role in the 
child’s life also is also a form of contribution.  
4.3 SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICES 
The SAPS is often the last resort for these unmarried fathers. The fact that the staff 
members are not educated enough to assist the unmarried fathers with enforcing 
parental rights and responsibilities is a grave concern and detrimental to society. The 
author’s proposal is that all SAPS members should receive training on the Children’s 
Act, specifically insofar as it relates to the enforcement and breach of parental rights 
and responsibilities agreements. The assistance of the SAPS in respect of a breach of 
an agreement or contempt of court charges may deter mothers from restricting or 
limiting the parental rights and responsibilities of unmarried fathers who have acquired 
such rights.  
5. OVERALL CONCLUSION 
The rights of unmarried fathers have indeed been ameliorated over the years. This 
dissertation, with the assistance of the primary research conducted, has outlined the 
challenges that still inhibit unmarried fathers from exercising their rights as contained in 
section 21 of the Children’s Act. The proposals made by the author are done with the 
view of making the rights of unmarried fathers more enforceable and effective in 
practice. Legislation is of no use if it is not enforceable.  This is what unmarried fathers 
have been battling with for years. Their parental rights and responsibilities were 
provided for in the Act, but due to the problems related to the interpretation of the Act, 
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access to justice and in most instances, financial considerations, their rights are 
practically defeated. In addition to this, the current procedures involved in applying for 
parental rights and responsibilities are time consuming. The aim of this dissertation is 
also to promote the insertion or adoption of an effective, less time consuming and 
inexpensive procedure for unmarried fathers to perfect their rights as contained in 
section 21 of the Act. The time has come to give all qualifying unmarried fathers the 
opportunity and assistance to claim their rights within the shortest time possible.  
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Annexure A 
The challenges that unmarried fathers face in respect of the right to contact and care of 
their children: can amendments to the current law make enforcement of these rights 
more effective? 
The law in its current form makes provision for unmarried fathers, but implementation of 
the law and enforcement of their rights is still very challenging. The rationale of this 
research is to make recommendations to the legislature in respect of amending the 
Children’s Act in an attempt to make enforcement of these rights more effective. 
The questions will be directed at the different role players in applications made in 
respect of Section 21 of Act 38 of 2005. The purpose is to ascertain the extent of the 
existing impediments as far as they relate to acquiring and exercising parental rights 
and responsibilities by unmarried fathers.     
1. In your experience, what are the challenges faced by unmarried fathers in (a) 
acquiring and (b) exercising  their rights as contained in section 21 of the Children’s Act 
38 of 2005?  
 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
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………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
2. Do these challenges mentioned in question 1 relate to a) the legislation b) access to 
justice or c) enforcement of the rights contained in section 21 of the Act? Please 
elaborate?        
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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3. Does the issue of automatic acquisition in section 20 of the Act pose more or less         
challenges than the conditional acquisition provided for in section 21 of the Act? 
Explain? 
............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................
............................................................................................................................................
........................................................................................................................................... 
4. Please specify and elaborate on any challenges that you have encountered with   
working towards a parental rights and responsibility agreement and explain the 
effectiveness of these agreements. 
.……………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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5. What in your opinion, should be done by the a) legislature and b) courts to make the 
application of section 21 of the Act more effective and/or practical? 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
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